The Prince (Penguin Great Ideas)

De (autor) Introducere de Anthony Grafton
Notă GoodReads:
en Limba Engleză Carte Paperback – 02 Sep 2004
Throughout history, some books have changed the world. They have transformed the way we see ourselves - and each other. They have inspired debate, dissent, war and revolution. They have enlightened, outraged, provoked and comforted. They have enriched lives - and destroyed them. Now Penguin brings you the works of the great thinkers, pioneers, radicals and visionaries whose ideas shook civilization, and helped make us who we are.
Citește tot Restrânge
Toate formatele și edițiile
Toate formatele și edițiile Preț Express
Carte Paperback (62) 1436 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +371 lei  5-7 zile
  Dover Publications – December 1992 1436 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +371 lei  5-7 zile
  HarperCollins Publishers – 2011 1688 lei  Economic 15-27 zile +316 lei  5-7 zile
  Wordsworth Editions – 1993 2596 lei  Economic 14-20 zile +173 lei  5-7 zile
  Penguin Books – 02 Sep 2004 2749 lei  Economic 15-26 zile +451 lei  5-7 zile
  Penguin Random House Group – 2001 2844 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +197 lei  9-16 zile
  Prohyptikon Publishing Inc. – 20 Mar 2009 2895 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +285 lei  9-16 zile
  Brolga Publishing – June 2012 2955 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt.
  COSIMO CLASSICS – November 2008 2961 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +293 lei  9-16 zile
  Vintage Publishing – 2009 3197 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +527 lei  5-7 zile
  Bantam Classics – 2003 3295 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +233 lei  9-16 zile
  Watchmaker Publishing – September 2011 3324 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +334 lei  9-16 zile – 2005 3473 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +311 lei  9-16 zile
  3649 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +262 lei  9-16 zile
  3660 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +264 lei  9-16 zile
  ALMA BOOKS – 12 Sep 2013 3677 lei  Economic 14-20 zile +223 lei  5-7 zile
  Arcturus Publishing – 15 Apr 2017 3695 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +623 lei  5-7 zile
  Wilder Publications – 02 May 2008 3808 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +391 lei  9-16 zile
  4068 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +296 lei  9-16 zile
  Penguin Books – February 2003 4278 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +313 lei  9-16 zile
  Simon & Brown – May 2011 4305 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +446 lei  9-16 zile
  HarperCollins Publishers – 14 Jun 2018 4395 lei  Economic 14-20 zile +466 lei  5-7 zile
  CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform – 4453 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +328 lei  9-16 zile
  4476 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +330 lei  9-16 zile
  Infinity – 18 Oct 2013 4589 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +478 lei  9-16 zile
  Simon & Brown – 13 Oct 2011 4589 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +478 lei  9-16 zile
  KUPERARD (BRAVO LTD) – 24 Apr 2008 4601 lei  Economic 15-27 zile +2439 lei  9-16 zile
  CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform – June 2010 4722 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +349 lei  9-16 zile
  Wilder Publications – 27 Mar 2007 4764 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +500 lei  9-16 zile
  CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform – 4795 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +355 lei  9-16 zile
  Simon & Brown – 11 Aug 2012 4920 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +518 lei  9-16 zile
  4925 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +366 lei  9-16 zile
  4980 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +371 lei  9-16 zile
  CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform – 4986 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +372 lei  9-16 zile
  CREATESPACE – 5015 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +374 lei  9-16 zile
  Simon & Brown – November 2011 5049 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +534 lei  9-16 zile
  CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform – 5156 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +384 lei  9-16 zile
  Soho Books – September 2011 5210 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +390 lei  9-16 zile
  CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform – May 2010 5754 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +433 lei  9-16 zile
  CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform – 5962 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +450 lei  9-16 zile
  6139 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +465 lei  9-16 zile
  6293 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +476 lei  9-16 zile
  Theophania Publishing – 6293 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +476 lei  9-16 zile
  Penguin Books – September 2005 6431 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +490 lei  9-16 zile
  Classic Books Library – July 2008 6474 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +697 lei  9-16 zile
  Waking Lion Press – 30 Jul 2008 6474 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +697 lei  9-16 zile
  Book Tree – March 2012 6521 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +495 lei  9-16 zile
  CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform – 6581 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +501 lei  9-16 zile
  CREATESPACE – 6623 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +504 lei  9-16 zile
  Race Point Publishing – 22 Feb 2017 6713 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +1402 lei  5-7 zile
  FastPencil, Inc. – July 2010 6892 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +657 lei  9-16 zile
  7001 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +536 lei  9-16 zile
  Boomer Books – July 2008 7013 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +759 lei  9-16 zile
  7211 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +690 lei  9-16 zile
  El Paso Norte Press – 10 Jul 2006 7431 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +570 lei  9-16 zile
  CREATESPACE – 7656 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +588 lei  9-16 zile
  Saint Bob Press – April 2008 7818 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +851 lei  9-16 zile
  Penguin Books – November 2009 8041 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +618 lei  9-16 zile
  CREATESPACE – 8253 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +636 lei  9-16 zile
  Wilder Publications – 27 Jan 2011 8366 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +914 lei  9-16 zile
  Lulu – 13 Nov 2015 9201 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +1207 lei  9-16 zile
  Hackett Publishing Company – 15 Mar 2008 10858 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +1887 lei  5-7 zile
  Sovereign – 24 Sep 2012 10394 lei  Economic 25-30 zile
Carte Hardback (15) 6621 lei  Economic 14-20 zile +633 lei  5-7 zile
  EVERYMAN – 04 Jun 1992 6621 lei  Economic 14-20 zile +633 lei  5-7 zile
  Simon & Brown – November 2011 8207 lei  Economic 14-20 zile +549 lei  5-7 zile
  Lits – November 2010 8317 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +909 lei  9-16 zile
  8325 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +836 lei  9-16 zile
  Simon & Brown – May 2011 8361 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +914 lei  9-16 zile
  Perfection Learning – June 2008 8760 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +677 lei  9-16 zile
  8981 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +985 lei  9-16 zile
  Arcturus Publishing – 15 Sep 2015 9088 lei  Economic 14-20 zile +1073 lei  5-7 zile
  Everyman's Library – June 1992 9828 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +764 lei  9-16 zile
  Lulu – 13 Nov 2015 15929 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +1574 lei  9-16 zile
  Engage Books – October 2015 21551 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +2432 lei  9-16 zile
  Hackett Publishing Company – 15 Mar 2008 27390 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. – 13 Feb 2017 11837 lei  Economic 25-30 zile
  Pinnacle – 24 May 2017 13037 lei  Economic 11-16 zile
  Pan Macmillan – 05 Sep 2019 5733 lei  Precomandă
CD-Audio (5) 5695 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +429 lei  9-16 zile
  Brilliance Audio – 25 Aug 2015 5695 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +429 lei  9-16 zile
  Gildan Media on Dreamscape Audio – 20 Sep 2016 9282 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +720 lei  9-16 zile
  HIGHBRIDGE AUDIO – 2007 9548 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +742 lei  9-16 zile
  Canongate Books – 26 May 2005 9653 lei  Economic 14-20 zile +204 lei  5-7 zile
  Gildan Media on Dreamscape Audio – 20 Sep 2016 18223 lei  Economic 2-4 săpt. +1446 lei  9-16 zile

Din seria Penguin Great Ideas

Preț: 2749 lei

Preț vechi: 3063 lei

Puncte Express: 41

Preț estimativ în valută:
550 624$ 472£

Carte disponibilă

Livrare economică 05-16 aprilie
Livrare express 26-28 martie pentru 1450 lei

Preluare comenzi: 021 569.72.76


ISBN-13: 9780141018850
ISBN-10: 0141018852
Pagini: 128
Dimensiuni: 111 x 181 x 7 mm
Greutate: 0.08 kg
Editura: Penguin Books
Colecția Penguin
Seria Penguin Great Ideas

Locul publicării: London, United Kingdom

Notă biografică

Niccoló Machiavelli (1469-1527) was appointed secretary and Second Chancellor to the Florentine Republic in 1498. He was dismissed from his post in 1512 and forced to withdraw from public life, after which time he wrote THE PRINCE, a handbook for rulers.

Textul de pe ultima copertă

That Machiavelli's name has become synonymous with cold-eyed political calculation only heightens the intrinsic fascination of The Prince - the world's pre-eminent how-to manual on the art of getting and keeping power, and one of the literary landmarks of the Italian Renaissance. Written in a vigorous, straightforward style which reflects its author's realism, this treatise on states, statecraft, and the ideal ruler is essential reading for anyone seeking to understand how human society actually works.


"If one were to assign a single edition of Machiavelli's works, this most certainly would be it" -- John. P. McCormick, Professor Of Political Science, University Of Chicago "Everyone should have a copy of Machiavelli's The Prince, whose original purpose may have been to counsel Renaissance rulers in the art of statecraft but is still applicable to and, indeed, acted on by modern politicians and power-brokers" Guardian "A 16th Century handbook of wily political thinking that tells you how to get the upper hand in every conceivable situation" Mail on Sunday "How amazing, that anyone's ideas should be controversial after five centuries. Machiavelli expressed a certain attitude to power - it's a good thing, and the problem is how to get and keep it - so well that he has never become out dated" Guardian "One of most influential books ever" Mirror


Chronology Map Introduction Translator's Note Selected Books Machiavelli's Principal Works Letter to the Magnificent Lorenzo de Medici 1 I How many kinds of principality there are and the ways in which they are acquired 5 II Hereditary principalities 5 III Composite principalities 6 IV Why the kingdom of Darius conquered by Alexander did not rebel against his successors after his death 13 V How cities or principalities which lived under their own laws should be administered after being conquered 16 VI New principalities acquired by one's own arms and prowess 17 VII New principalities acquired with the help of fortune and foreign arms 20 VIII Those who come to power by crime 27 IX The constitutional principality 31 X How the strength of every principality should be measured 34 XI Ecclesiastical principalities 36 XII Military organization and mercenary troops 39 XIII Auxiliary, composite, and native troops 43 XIV How a prince should organize his militia 47 XV The things for which men, and especially princes, are praised or blamed 49 XVI Generosity and parsimony 51 XVII Cruelty and compassion; and whether it is better to be loved than feared, or the reverse 53 XVIII How princes should honour their word 56 XIX The need to avoid contempt and hatred 58 XX Whether fortresses and many of the other present-day expedients to which princes have recourse are useful or not 67 XXI How a prince must act to win honour 71 XXII A prince's personal staff 75 XXIII How flatterers must be shunned 76 XXIV Why the Italian princes have lost their states 78 XXV How far human affairs are governed by fortune, and how fortune can be opposed 79 XXVI Exhortation to liberate Italy from the barbarians 82 Glossary of Proper Names 86 Notes 99


Niccolò Machiavelli to His Magnificence Lorenzo de’ Medici1

Those who wish to win the favor of a prince will generally approach him with gifts of what they value most or what they believe will most delight him. Hence we see princes being offered horses, arms, vestments of gold, precious stones, and similar accoutrements worthy of their grandeur. Wishing to present myself to Your Magnificence with a token of my deepest respect, I have found among my possessions nothing that I value or esteem higher than my knowledge of the deeds of great men. I have acquired this knowledge through my long experience of modern affairs and a lifelong study of ancient times, all of which I have weighed and examined with great diligence and brought together into this small volume, which I am now offering to Your Magnificence. Though I deem this work unworthy of being in Your illustrious presence, my confidence in Your benevolence persuades me that it will be accepted, and that Your Magnificence will recognize that I cannot offer You a greater gift than the prospect of Your understanding in the shortest period all that I have experienced and learned over so many years and with so much danger and hardship. I have not filled this volume with pompous rhetoric, with bombast and magnificent words, or with the unnecessary artifice with which so many writers gild their work. I wanted nothing extraneous to ornament my writing, for it has been my purpose that only the range of material and the gravity of the subject should make it pleasing. Nor do I wish it to be thought presumptuous that a man of low and humble condition like myself should presume to map out and direct the government of princes. But just as a cartographer will descend into the plains in order to study the nature of the mountains, and will then climb the highest peaks in order to study the low-lying land, so, too, only an exalted prince can grasp the nature of the people, and only a lesser man can perceive the nature of a prince.

I hope therefore that Your Magnificence will accept this humble gift in the spirit in which it is offered. Should You condescend to read and consider it carefully, You will perceive in its pages my profound desire that Your Magnificence will rise to the greatness that Fortune and Your qualities promise. And should Your Magnificence deign to look down from the lofty summit of Your eminence to these lowly depths, You will see how I have suffered undeservedly Fortune’s great and continuing malignity.

1. Lorenzo de’ Medici (1492—1519) was the grandson of Lorenzo the Magnificent.

Chapter One
Of the kinds of principalities that exist, and how they can be acquired

All states, all dominions that rule or have ruled over men, are or have been either republics or principalities. Principalities are either hereditary, with a long-established bloodline, or new. And the new principalities are either entirely new, as Milan was to Francesco Sforza2, or are like limbs added to the hereditary state of the prince who acquires them, as the Kingdom of Naples was to the King of Spain3. States obtained in this way are accustomed either to living under a prince, or to being free. They are acquired either with the arms of others, or with one’s own, either by chance or by skill.

2. Francesco Sforza (1401—66) was a soldier of fortune who became Duke of Milan in 1450.
3. Ferdinand the Catholic (1452—1516), King of Aragon, also became Ferdinand III of Naples in 1504.

Chapter Two
Of hereditary principalities

I will not discuss republics, as I have already done so at some length elsewhere. I shall only concentrate on principalities, and shall weave together the threads I have already laid out. I will show how these principalities can be governed and main- tained.

First, states that are hereditary and tied to the bloodline of their prince are easier to maintain than new ones. It is enough not to diverge from the practices of one’s forebears, and to handle unforeseen issues as they arise. If such a prince is of at least average ability he can retain his posi- tion of power, so long as no extraordinary or excessive force deprive him of it. If this prince is deprived of his state, he will find he can reacquire it if any misfortune befalls the usurper.

In Italy we have the example of the Duke of Ferrara, who resisted the assaults of the Venetians in 1484 and of Pope Julius II in 1510, for the simple reason that he had inherited an ancient principality4. A hereditary prince has less cause to mistreat his subjects, and so is more loved by them. If unusual vices do not make him hated, it is to be expected that he will be loved by his people.

The long continuum of the dominion obliterates the memories and issues that make men yearn for innovation, for one change will inevitably forge a link to another.

4. In fact, Duke Ercole d’Este of Ferrara managed to end the war with Venetians in 1484, while his son Duke Alfonso managed to stay in power despite excommunication and an ongoing war with the papal forces.

Chapter Three
Of mixed principalities

It is in the new principality that the difficulties lie. First, if the principality is not completely new, but is like a limb or extension added to another principality (in which case we could almost call the whole state a mixed principality), its volatility stems mainly from a difficulty inherent in all new principalities. This is that men will willingly change their ruler in the hope that they will fare better, a hope that leads them to take up arms against their old ruler. But in this they are deceived, because, as they invariably discover, their lot under a new ruler is inevitably worse. This is the result of another natural and basic inevitability: that you cannot avoid offending those whose new ruler you are, both with your armed soldiers and with innumerable other provocations that come in the wake of a conquest. You end up making enemies of all those you have offended during your conquest of the principality, and you find that you cannot keep the friendship of those who helped you to power, since you cannot satisfy them in the way they had envisioned. Furthermore, you cannot take strong measures against them, as you are indebted to them. Even with the most powerful army, if you want to invade a state, you need the support of the people. It was for these reasons that King Louis XII of France was quick to occupy Milan, and just as quick to lose it. Duke Ludovico’s own forces were enough to win Milan back the first time, because the same masses that had opened the gates for Louis, finding themselves misled in their hopes for a better future, could not endure the new prince’s offenses5.

It is a fact that once a prince acquires a rebellious state for the second time, it also proves harder to lose that state a second time6. This is because the prince who seizes the opportunity of the rebellion has fewer scruples about securing his position by punishing offenders, flushing out suspects, and strengthening all the places where he is weakest. In this sense, it was enough for a Duke Ludovico to make a little noise along the borders for Louis XII to lose Milan the first time. But for him to lose Milan a second time the whole world had to unite against him, defeat his army, and chase it out of Italy7. This followed from the causes I have already laid out. Nonetheless, both the first and second time, Milan was taken from him.

The general reasons for the first loss have been discussed. It now remains to discuss the second, and to see what recourse someone in Louis’s position could have taken to maintain himself more securely in his new acquisition. I must stress that the states a prince acquires and adds to his own are either of the same country and language, or are not. If they are it is much easier to retain them, particularly if they are not used to freedom. To hold them securely, it is enough to extinguish the line of the previous prince who ruled them. As for the rest, if the new acquisition’s former state of affairs is kept and there is no difference in customs, men will live quite peacefully, as we have seen in Burgundy, Brittany, Gascony, and Normandy, which for a long time now have all belonged to France. Although there is some difference in language, their customs are similar, and their people get along with one another quite easily. He who acquires such states and wishes to retain them has to make sure of two things: that the bloodline of their former princes is extinguished, and that their laws and taxes remain the same. This way, the prince’s new state merges with the old, quickly becoming a single body.

But difficulties arise when you acquire states in a land with differing languages, customs, and laws. To keep these states, you need good fortune and much diligence. One of the best and quickest solutions is for the new prince to go and live in his new state. This makes the possession more durable and secure. The Turk did this in Greece8. With all the other measures he took to keep Greece in his possession, had he not gone to live there he would not have succeeded, because once the prince is established within his new state he is able to see problems as they arise and can remedy them. If he is not there, problems become obvious only once they are dire and can no longer be remedied. Furthermore, if he is present, his new state will not be looted by his officials, and his new subjects can enjoy immediate access to their prince. This will give them more reason to love him if they are on his side, and to fear him if they are not, and foreign powers wishing to attack his state will respect him more. Hence, if the prince lives in his new state, it is difficult for him to lose it.

Another efficient remedy is to set up colonies in one or two places that will act as the shackles of your new state. If you do not set up colonies, you will have to send a great number of troops to secure it, while a colony can be established and maintained at negligible cost. The only subjects who will be affronted are those whose fields and houses will be confiscated to be given to the new colonists. But these dispossessed subjects make up only a small part of the state and will end up poor and dispersed, and so can do no harm. The rest of your new subjects will not be affronted (and hence will be acquiescent), but will also be frightened of transgressing, worried that they too might be dispossessed. I conclude that colonies do not cost much, are loyal, and will cause less trouble. And as I have already mentioned, those you dispossess cannot harm you, as they will be poor and dispersed. In short, men must either be flattered or eliminated, because a man will readily avenge a slight grievance, but not one that is truly severe. Hence, the offense done a man must be of the kind that cannot incur vengeance.

If you choose armed forces instead of colonies, you will spend more and will have to squander all the income from the new state in order to pay the army. This will turn the acquisition into a loss, and all your new subjects will end up offended, since an army, constantly on the move and constantly requartered, hurts the whole state. Everyone feels the pain, and everyone becomes your enemy. And these are enemies who can harm you, because though they have been defeated, they remain on their own ground. So in every sense, using armed forces is as useless as setting up colonies is useful.

It is also important when a prince has conquered a foreign state that he become the protector of the surrounding weaker powers, and do all he can to weaken the stronger ones. He must take precautions so that no foreigner equal in power manages to enter his new state. If he should enter, it will be because he was brought in by discontented factions driven by ambition or fear. We saw this in the case of the Aetolians who introduced the Romans into Greece;9 and in every other province in which the Romans set foot, it was with the help of some of the inhabitants. The order of things is that the moment a powerful invader takes over a state, all the weaker factions within it join forces with him, spurred on by their envy of the ruler who had wielded power over them before. In other words, the new prince has no trouble winning the weaker factions over, because they will willingly become part of his new state. He has only to see to it that they do not gain too much power and authority. With his forces and their favor, he can easily bring down those who are powerful so that he will remain the only arbiter in the land. He who does not follow this course will quickly lose all he has gained, and will be plagued by infinite difficulties while he holds power.

5. Louis XII occupied Milan in September 1499, but was ousted in February 1500 by Ludovico Sforza. Louis, however, managed to recapture Milan within two months.
6. Once Louis XII recaptured Milan, it remained under his rule until 1512.
7. The Holy League of 1511, organized by Pope Julius II, was an anti-French coalition that included Spain, Venice, the Holy Roman Empire, England, and the Swiss. The League managed to drive the French out of Milan in May 1512.
8. The Turks occupied Constantinople in 1453, and in 1457 transferred the capital of the Ottoman Empire from Edirne to Constantinople.