Cantitate/Preț
Produs
Total produse
Vezi coșul
Decision and Game Theory for Security: 13th International Conference, GameSec 2022, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, October 26–28, 2022, Proceedings de Fei Fang

Decision and Game Theory for Security: 13th International Conference, GameSec 2022, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, October 26–28, 2022, Proceedings: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, cartea 13727

Editat de Fei Fang, Haifeng Xu, Yezekael Hayel
en Limba Engleză Paperback – 9 feb 2023
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2022, held in October 2022 in Pittsburgh, PA, USA. The 15 full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 39 submissions. The papers are grouped thematically on: deception in security; planning and learning in dynamic environments; security games; adversarial learning and optimization; novel applications and new game models.
Citește tot Restrânge

Din seria Lecture Notes in Computer Science

Preț: 46024 lei

Preț vechi: 57530 lei
-20% Nou

Puncte Express: 690
Preț estimativ în valută:
8144€ • 9498$ • 7151£

Carte disponibilă

Livrare economică 25 decembrie 25 - 08 ianuarie 26
Livrare express 11-17 decembrie pentru 3330 lei

 Adaugă în coș

Wish list
Gift list
Am citit!
Adaugă în listă
Preluare comenzi: 021 569.72.76

Specificații

ISBN-13: 9783031263682
ISBN-10: 3031263685
Pagini: 319
Ilustrații: XII, 319 p. 90 illus., 79 illus. in color.
Dimensiuni: 155 x 235 x 20 mm
Greutate: 0.47 kg
Ediția:1st ed. 2023
Editura: Springer International Publishing
Colecția Springer
Seria Lecture Notes in Computer Science

Locul publicării:Cham, Switzerland

Cuprins

Deception in Security.- The Risk of Attacker Behavioral Learning: Can Attacker Fool Defender under Uncertainty? .-Casino Rationale: Countering attacker deception in zero-sum Stackelberg security games of bounded rationality.- Cyber Deception against Zero-day Attacks: A Game Theoretic Approach.- Planning and Learning in Dynamic Enviroments.- On Almost-Sure Intention Deception Planning that Exploits Imperfect Observers.- Using Deception in Markov Game to Understand Adversarial Behaviors through a Capture-The-Flag Environment.- Robust Moving Target Defense against Unknown Attacks: A Meta-Reinforcement Learning Approach.- Security Games.- Synchronization in Security Games.- Multiple Oracle Algorithm to Solve Continuous Games.- Optimal Pursuit of Surveilling Agents near a High Value Target.- Adversarial Learning and Optimization.- On Poisoned Wardrop Equilibrium in Congestion Games.- Reward Delay Attacks on Deep Reinforcement Learning.- An Exploration of Poisoning Attacks on Data-based Decision Making.- Novel Applications and new Game Models.- A Network Centrality Game for Epidemic Control.- Optimizing Intrusion Detection Systems Placement against Network Virus Spreading using a Partially Observable Stochastic Minimum-Threat Path Game.- Voting Games to Model Protocol Stability and Security of Proof-of-Work Cryptocurrencies.