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Security Engineering de Ross Anderson

Security Engineering

Autor Ross Anderson
en Limba Engleză Hardback – 26 ian 2021

Ne-a atras atenția modul în care Security Engineering reușește să transforme o disciplină adesea abstractă într-o metodologie de proiectare riguroasă și aplicabilă. Găsim în această ediție a treia, semnată de Ross Anderson, o actualizare critică a principiilor de bază pentru era cloud, smartphone și Internet of Things. Abordarea autorului este profund tehnică, plecând de la premisa că securitatea nu este un produs care se adaugă ulterior, ci o proprietate emergentă a sistemelor bine construite. Apreciem structura progresivă a volumului, care depășește 1200 de pagini. Primele capitole stabilesc cadrul conceptual prin exemple pragmatice — de la sisteme bancare la baze militare și spitale — pentru a trece apoi la o analiză exhaustivă a profilului atacatorilor. Cuprinsul relevă o acoperire vastă, de la protocoalele „Five Eyes” și infrastructura botnet-urilor, până la ingineria de tip DevSecOps necesară în dezvoltarea agilă. Spre deosebire de Security in Computing, care păstrează o orientare mai academică spre politici și procese, lucrarea lui Anderson este mai ancorată în realitatea tehnică a implementării, oferind detalii specifice despre exploatarea vulnerabilităților și apărarea împotriva lor. În contextul operei sale, această lucrare rămâne pilonul central al carierei academice a lui Ross Anderson, fiind mult mai tehnică și specializată decât alte scrieri ale sale care explorează istoria sau scenografia. Autorul reușește să integreze economia securității și psihologia utilizatorului, explicând de ce sistemele eșuează nu doar din cauza codului defectuos, ci și a stimulentelor economice greșite. Este un ghid esențial pentru a înțelege cum putem menține securitatea pe termen lung în dispozitive critice, precum mașinile autonome sau echipamentele medicale.

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Specificații

ISBN-13: 9781119642787
ISBN-10: 1119642787
Pagini: 1232
Dimensiuni: 200 x 244 x 57 mm
Greutate: 2.13 kg
Ediția:3. Auflage
Editura: Wiley
Locul publicării:Hoboken, United States

De ce să citești această carte

Recomandăm această carte inginerilor de sistem și arhitecților software care au nevoie de un fundament solid în proiectarea sistemelor rezistente la atacuri și erori. Veți câștiga o perspectivă integrată asupra modului în care criptografia, protocoalele și factorul uman interacționează în ecosistemele moderne de cloud și IoT. Este resursa definitivă pentru oricine dorește să treacă de la securitatea reactivă la o inginerie proactivă și sustenabilă.

Despre autor

Ross Anderson este profesor la Universitatea Cambridge și un pionier recunoscut în stabilirea ingineriei securității ca disciplină academică și practică. Cu o carieră dedicată studiului sistemelor distribuite dependabile, Anderson a reușit să influențeze modul în care industria IT privește vulnerabilitățile, punând accent nu doar pe aspectele tehnice, ci și pe cele economice și psihologice. Experiența sa vastă în cercetarea protocoalelor de securitate și a criptografiei aplicate se reflectă în calitatea și profunzimea acestei lucrări fundamentale.

Notă biografică

ROSS ANDERSON is Professor of Security Engineering at Cambridge University in England. He is widely recognized as one of the world's foremost authorities on security. In 2015 he won the Lovelace Medal, Britain's top award in computing. He is a Fellow of the Royal Society and the Royal Academy of Engineering. He is one of the pioneers of the economics of information security, peer-to-peer systems, API analysis and hardware security. Over the past 40 years, he has also worked or consulted for most of the tech majors.

Cuprins

Preface to the Third Edition xxxvii Preface to the Second Edition xli Preface to the First Edition xliii Formy daughter, and other lawyers... xlvii Foreword xlix Part I Chapter 1 What Is Security Engineering? 3 1.1 Introduction 3 1.2 A framework 4 1.3 Example 1 - a bank 6 1.4 Example 2 - a military base 7 1.5 Example 3 - a hospital 8 1.6 Example 4 - the home 10 1.7 Definitions 11 1.8 Summary 16 Chapter 2 Who Is the Opponent? 17 2.1 Introduction 17 2.2 Spies 19 2.2.1 The Five Eyes 19 2.2.1.1 Prism 19 2.2.1.2 Tempora 20 2.2.1.3 Muscular 21 2.2.1.4 Special collection 22 2.2.1.5 Bullrun and Edgehill 22 2.2.1.6 Xkeyscore 23 2.2.1.7 Longhaul 24 2.2.1.8 Quantum 25 2.2.1.9 CNE 25 2.2.1.10 The analyst's viewpoint 27 2.2.1.11 Offensive operations 28 2.2.1.12 Attack scaling 29 2.2.2 China 30 2.2.3 Russia 35 2.2.4 The rest 38 2.2.5 Attribution 40 2.3 Crooks 41 2.3.1 Criminal infrastructure 42 2.3.1.1 Botnet herders 42 2.3.1.2 Malware devs 44 2.3.1.3 Spam senders 45 2.3.1.4 Bulk account compromise 45 2.3.1.5 Targeted attackers 46 2.3.1.6 Cashout gangs 46 2.3.1.7 Ransomware 47 2.3.2 Attacks on banking and payment systems 47 2.3.3 Sectoral cybercrime ecosystems 49 2.3.4 Internal attacks 49 2.3.5 CEO crimes 49 2.3.6 Whistleblowers 50 2.4 Geeks 52 2.5 The swamp 53 2.5.1 Hacktivism and hate campaigns 54 2.5.2 Child sex abuse material 55 2.5.3 School and workplace bullying 57 2.5.4 Intimate relationship abuse 57 2.6 Summary 59 Research problems 60 Further reading 61 Chapter 3 Psychology and Usability 63 3.1 Introduction 63 3.2 Insights from psychology research 64 3.2.1 Cognitive psychology 65 3.2.2 Gender, diversity and interpersonal variation 68 3.2.3 Social psychology 70 3.2.3.1 Authority and its abuse 71 3.2.3.2 The bystander effect 72 3.2.4 The social-brain theory of deception 73 3.2.5 Heuristics, biases and behavioural economics 76 3.2.5.1 Prospect theory and risk misperception 77 3.2.5.2 Present bias and hyperbolic discounting 78 3.2.5.3 Defaults and nudges 79 3.2.5.4 The default to intentionality 79 3.2.5.5 The affect heuristic 80 3.2.5.6 Cognitive dissonance 81 3.2.5.7 The risk thermostat 81 3.3 Deception in practice 81 3.3.1 The salesman and the scamster 82 3.3.2 Social engineering 84 3.3.3 Phishing 86 3.3.4 Opsec 88 3.3.5 Deception research 89 3.4 Passwords 90 3.4.1 Password recovery 92 3.4.2 Password choice 94 3.4.3 Difficulties with reliable password entry 94 3.4.4 Difficulties with remembering the password 95 3.4.4.1 Naïve choice 96 3.4.4.2 User abilities and training 96 3.4.4.3 Design errors 98 3.4.4.4 Operational failures 100 3.4.4.5 Social-engineering attacks 101 3.4.4.6 Customer education 102 3.4.4.7 Phishing warnings 103 3.4.5 System issues 104 3.4.6 Can you deny service? 105 3.4.7 Protecting oneself or others? 105 3.4.8 Attacks on password entry 106 3.4.8.1 Interface design 106 3.4.8.2 Trusted path, and bogus terminals 107 3.4.8.3 Technical defeats of password retry counters 107 3.4.9 Attacks on password storage 108 3.4.9.1 One-way encryption 109 3.4.9.2 Password cracking 109 3.4.9.3 Remote password checking 109 3.4.10 Absolute limits 110 3.4.11 Using a password manager 111 3.4.12 Will we ever get rid of passwords? 113 3.5 CAPTCHAs 115 3.6 Summary 116 Research problems 117 Further reading 118 Chapter 4 Protocols 119 4.1 Introduction 119 4.2 Password eavesdropping risks 120 4.3 Who goes there? - simple authentication 122 4.3.1 Challenge and response 124 4.3.2 Two-factor authentication 128 4.3.3 The MIG-in-the-middle attack 129 4.3.4 Reflection attacks 132 4.4 Manipulating the message 133 4.5 Changing the environment 134 4.6 Chosen protocol attacks 135 4.7 Managing encryption keys 136 4.7.1 The resurrecting duckling 137 4.7.2 Remote key management 137 4.7.3 The Needham-Schroeder protocol 138 4.7.4 Kerberos 139 4.7.5 Practical key management 141 4.8 Design assurance 141 4.9 Summary 143 Research problems 143 Further reading 144 Chapter 5 Cryptography 145 5.1 Introduction 145 5.2 Historical background 146 5.2.1 An early stream cipher - the Vigenère 147 5.2.2 The one-time pad 148 5.2.3 An early block cipher - Playfair 150 5.2.4 Hash functions 152 5.2.5 Asymmetric primitives 154 5.3 Security models 155 5.3.1 Random functions - hash functions 157 5.3.1.1 Properties 157 5.3.1.2 The birthday theorem 158 5.3.2 Random generators - stream ciphers 159 5.3.3 Random permutations - block ciphers 161 5.3.4 Public key encryption and trapdoor one-way permutations 163 5.3.5 Digital signatures 164 5.4 Symmetric crypto algorithms 165 5.4.1 SP-networks 165 5.4.1.1 Block size 166 5.4.1.2 Number of rounds 166 5.4.1.3 Choice of S-boxes 167 5.4.1.4 Linear cryptanalysis 167 5.4.1.5 Differential cryptanalysis 168 5.4.2 The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 169 5.4.3 Feistel ciphers 171 5.4.3.1 The Luby-Rackoff result 173 5.4.3.2 DES 173 5.5 Modes of operation 175 5.5.1 How not to use a block cipher 176 5.5.2 Cipher block chaining 177 5.5.3 Counter encryption 178 5.5.4 Legacy stream cipher modes 178 5.5.5 Message authentication code 179 5.5.6 Galois counter mode 180 5.5.7 XTS 180 5.6 Hash functions 181 5.6.1 Common hash functions 181 5.6.2 Hash function applications - HMAC, commitments and updating 183 5.7 Asymmetric crypto primitives 185 5.7.1 Cryptography based on factoring 185 5.7.2 Cryptography based on discrete logarithms 188 5.7.2.1 One-way commutative encryption 189 5.7.2.2 Diffie-Hellman key establishment 190 5.7.2.3 ElGamal digital signature and DSA 192 5.7.3 Elliptic curve cryptography 193 5.7.4 Certification authorities 194 5.7.5 TLS 195 5.7.5.1 TLS uses 196 5.7.5.2 TLS security 196 5.7.5.3 TLS 1.3 197 5.7.6 Other public-key protocols 197 5.7.6.1 Code signing 197 5.7.6.2 PGP/GPG 198 5.7.6.3 QUIC 199 5.7.7 Special-purpose primitives 199 5.7.8 How strong are asymmetric cryptographic primitives? 200 5.7.9 What else goes wrong 202 5.8 Summary 203 Research problems 204 Further reading 204 Chapter 6 Access Control 207 6.1 Introduction 207 6.2 Operating system access controls 209 6.2.1 Groups and roles 210 6.2.2 Access control lists 211 6.2.3 Unix operating system security 212 6.2.4 Capabilities 214 6.2.5 DAC and MAC 215 6.2.6 Apple's macOS 217 6.2.7 iOS 217 6.2.8 Android 218 6.2.9 Windows 219 6.2.10 Middleware 222 6.2.10.1 Database access controls 222 6.2.10.2 Browsers 223 6.2.11 Sandboxing 224 6.2.12 Virtualisation 225 6.3 Hardware protection 227 6.3.1 Intel processors 228 6.3.2 Arm processors 230 6.4 What goes wrong 231 6.4.1 Smashing the stack 232 6.4.2 Other technical attacks 234 6.4.3 User interface failures 236 6.4.4 Remedies 237 6.4.5 Environmental creep 238 6.5 Summary 239 Research problems 240 Further reading 240 Chapter 7 Distributed Systems 243 7.1 Introduction 243 7.2 Concurrency 244 7.2.1 Using old data versus paying to propagate state 245 7.2.2 Locking to prevent inconsistent updates 246 7.2.3 The order of updates 247 7.2.4 Deadlock 248 7.2.5 Non-convergent state 249 7.2.6 Secure time 250 7.3 Fault tolerance and failure recovery 251 7.3.1 Failure models 252 7.3.1.1 Byzantine failure 252 7.3.1.2 Interaction with fault tolerance 253 7.3.2 What is resilience for? 254 7.3.3 At what level is the redundancy? 255 7.3.4 Service-denial attacks 257 7.4 Naming 259 7.4.1 The Needham naming principles 260 7.4.2 What else goes wrong 263 7.4.2.1 Naming and identity 264 7.4.2.2 Cultural assumptions 265 7.4.2.3 Semantic content of names 267 7.4.2.4 Uniqueness of names 268 7.4.2.5 Stability of names and addresses 269 7.4.2.6 Restrictions on the use of names 269 7.4.3 Types of name 270 7.5 Summary 271 Research problems 272 Further reading 273 Chapter 8 Economics 275 8.1 Introduction 275 8.2 Classical economics 276 8.2.1 Monopoly 278 8.3 Information economics 281 8.3.1 Why information markets are different 281 8.3.2 The value of lock-in 282 8.3.3 Asymmetric information 284 8.3.4 Public goods 285 8.4 Game theory 286 8.4.1 The prisoners' dilemma 287 8.4.2 Repeated and evolutionary games 288 8.5 Auction theory 291 8.6 The economics of security and dependability 293 8.6.1 Why is Windows so insecure? 294 8.6.2 Managing the patching cycle 296 8.6.3 Structural models of attack and defence 298 8.6.4 The economics of lock-in, tying and DRM 300 8.6.5 Antitrust law and competition policy 302 8.6.6 Perversely motivated guards 304 8.6.7 Economics of privacy 305 8.6.8 Organisations and human behaviour 307 8.6.9 Economics of cybercrime 308 8.7 Summary 310 Research problems 311 Further reading 311 Part II Chapter 9 Multilevel Security 315 9.1 Introduction 315 9.2 What is a security policy model? 316 9.3 Multilevel security policy 318 9.3.1 The Anderson report 319 9.3.2 The Bell-LaPadula model 320 9.3.3 The standard criticisms of Bell-LaPadula 321 9.3.4 The evolution of MLS policies 323 9.3.5 The Biba model 325 9.4 Historical examples of MLS systems 326 9.4.1 SCOMP 326 9.4.2 Data diodes 327 9.5 MAC: from MLS to IFC and integrity 329 9.5.1 Windows 329 9.5.2 SELinux 330 9.5.3 Embedded systems 330 9.6 What goes wrong 331 9.6.1 Composability 331 9.6.2 The cascade problem 332 9.6.3 Covert channels 333 9.6.4 The threat from malware 333 9.6.5 Polyinstantiation 334 9.6.6 Practical problems with MLS 335 9.7 Summary 337 Research problems 338 Further reading 339 Chapter 10 Boundaries 341 10.1 Introduction 341 10.2 Compartmentation and the lattice model 344 10.3 Privacy for tigers 346 10.4 Health record privacy 349 10.4.1 The threat model 351 10.4.2 The BMA security policy 353 10.4.3 First practical steps 356 10.4.4 What actually goes wrong 357 10.4.4.1 Emergency care 358 10.4.4.2 Resilience 359 10.4.4.3 Secondary uses 359 10.4.5 Confidentiality - the future 362 10.4.6 Ethics 365 10.4.7 Social care and education 367 10.4.8 The Chinese Wall 369 10.5 Summary 371 Research problems 372 Further reading 373 Chapter 11 Inference Control 375 11.1 Introduction 375 11.2 The early history of inference control 377 11.2.1 The basic theory of inference control 378 11.2.1.1 Query set size control 378 11.2.1.2 Trackers 379 11.2.1.3 Cell suppression 379 11.2.1.4 Other statistical disclosure control mechanisms 380 11.2.1.5 More sophisticated query controls 381 11.2.1.6 Randomization 382 11.2.2 Limits of classical statistical security 383 11.2.3 Active attacks 384 11.2.4 Inference control in rich medical data 385 11.2.5 The third wave: preferences and search 388 11.2.6 The fourth wave: location and social 389 11.3 Differential privacy 392 11.4 Mind the gap? 394 11.4.1 Tactical anonymity and its problems 395 11.4.2 Incentives 398 11.4.3 Alternatives 399 11.4.4 The dark side 400 11.5 Summary 401 Research problems 402 Further reading 402 Chapter 12 Banking and Bookkeeping 405 12.1 Introduction 405 12.2 Bookkeeping systems 406 12.2.1 Double-entry bookkeeping 408 12.2.2 Bookkeeping in banks 408 12.2.3 The Clark-Wilson security policy model 410 12.2.4 Designing internal controls 411 12.2.5 Insider frauds 415 12.2.6 Executive frauds 416 12.2.6.1 The post office case 418 12.2.6.2 Other failures 419 12.2.6.3 Ecological validity 420 12.2.6.4 Control tuning and corporate governance 421 12.2.7 Finding the weak spots 422 12.3 Interbank payment systems 424 12.3.1 A telegraphic history of E-commerce 424 12.3.2 SWIFT 425 12.3.3 What goes wrong 427 12.4 Automatic teller machines 430 12.4.1 ATM basics 430 12.4.2 What goes wrong 433 12.4.3 Incentives and injustices 437 12.5 Credit cards 438 12.5.1 Credit card fraud 439 12.5.2 Online card fraud 440 12.5.3 3DS 443 12.5.4 Fraud engines 444 12.6 EMV payment cards 445 12.6.1 Chip cards 445 12.6.1.1 Static data authentication 446 12.6.1.2 ICVVs, DDA and CDA 450 12.6.1.3 The No-PIN attack 451 12.6.2 The preplay attack 452 12.6.3 Contactless 454 12.7 Online banking 457 12.7.1 Phishing 457 12.7.2 CAP 458 12.7.3 Banking malware 459 12.7.4 Phones as second factors 459 12.7.5 Liability 461 12.7.6 Authorised push payment fraud 462 12.8 Nonbank payments 463 12.8.1 M-Pesa 463 12.8.2 Other phone payment systems 464 12.8.3 Sofort, and open banking 465 12.9 Summary 466 Research problems 466 Further reading 468 Chapter 13 Locks and Alarms 471 13.1 Introduction 471 13.2 Threats and barriers 472 13.2.1 Threat model 473 13.2.2 Deterrence 474 13.2.3 Walls and barriers 476 13.2.4 Mechanical locks 478 13.2.5 Electronic locks 482 13.3 Alarms 484 13.3.1 How not to protect a painting 485 13.3.2 Sensor defeats 486 13.3.3 Feature interactions 488 13.3.4 Attacks on communications 489 13.3.5 Lessons learned 493 13.4 Summary 494 Research problems 495 Further reading 495 Chapter 14 Monitoring and Metering 497 14.1 Introduction 497 14.2 Prepayment tokens 498 14.2.1 Utility metering 499 14.2.2 How the STS system works 501 14.2.3 What goes wrong 502 14.2.4 Smart meters and smart grids 504 14.2.5 Ticketing fraud 508 14.3 Taxi meters, tachographs and truck speed limiters 509 14.3.1 The tachograph 509 14.3.2 What goes wrong 511 14.3.2.1 How most tachograph manipulation is done 511 14.3.2.2 Tampering with the supply 512 14.3.2.3 Tampering with the instrument 512 14.3.2.4 High-tech attacks 513 14.3.3 Digital tachographs 514 14.3.3.1 System-level problems 515 14.3.3.2 Other problems 516 14.3.4 Sensor defeats and third-generation devices 518 14.3.5 The fourth generation - smart tachographs 518 14.4 Curfew tags: GPS as policeman 519 14.5 Postage meters 522 14.6 Summary 526 Research problems 527 Further reading 527 Chapter 15 Nuclear Command and Control 529 15.1 Introduction 529 15.2 The evolution of command and control 532 15.2.1 The Kennedy memorandum 532 15.2.2 Authorization, environment, intent 534 15.3 Unconditionally secure authentication 534 15.4 Shared control schemes 536 15.5 Tamper resistance and PALs 538 15.6 Treaty verification 540 15.7 What goes wrong 541 15.7.1 Nuclear accidents 541 15.7.2 Interaction with cyberwar 542 15.7.3 Technical failures 543 15.8 Secrecy or openness? 544 15.9 Summary 545 Research problems 546 Further reading 546 Chapter 16 Security Printing and Seals 549 16.1 Introduction 549 16.2 History 550 16.3 Security printing 551 16.3.1 Threat model 552 16.3.2 Security printing techniques 553 16.4 Packaging and seals 557 16.4.1 Substrate properties 558 16.4.2 The problems of glue 558 16.4.3 PIN mailers 559 16.5 Systemic vulnerabilities 560 16.5.1 Peculiarities of the threat model 562 16.5.2 Anti-gundecking measures 563 16.5.3 The effect of random failure 564 16.5.4 Materials control 564 16.5.5 Not protecting the right things 565 16.5.6 The cost and nature of inspection 566 16.6 Evaluation methodology 567 16.7 Summary 569 Research problems 569 Further reading 570 Chapter 17 Biometrics 571 17.1 Introduction 571 17.2 Handwritten signatures 572 17.3 Face recognition 575 17.4 Fingerprints 579 17.4.1 Verifying positive or negative identity claims 581 17.4.2 Crime scene forensics 584 17.5 Iris codes 588 17.6 Voice recognition and morphing 590 17.7 Other systems 591 17.8 What goes wrong 593 17.9 Summary 596 Research problems 597 Further reading 597 Chapter 18 Tamper Resistance 599 18.1 Introduction 599 18.2 History 601 18.3 Hardware security modules 601 18.4 Evaluation 607 18.5 Smartcards and other security chips 609 18.5.1 History 609 18.5.2 Architecture 610 18.5.3 Security evolution 611 18.5.4 Random number generators and PUFs 621 18.5.5 Larger chips 624 18.5.6 The state of the art 628 18.6 The residual risk 630 18.6.1 The trusted interface problem 630 18.6.2 Conflicts 631 18.6.3 The lemons market, risk dumping and evaluation games 632 18.6.4 Security-by-obscurity 632 18.6.5 Changing environments 633 18.7 So what should one protect? 634 18.8 Summary 636 Research problems 636 Further reading 636 Chapter 19 Side Channels 639 19.1 Introduction 639 19.2 Emission security 640 19.2.1 History 641 19.2.2 Technical surveillance and countermeasures 642 19.3 Passive attacks 645 19.3.1 Leakage through power and signal cables 645 19.3.2 Leakage through RF signals 645 19.3.3 What goes wrong 649 19.4 Attacks between and within computers 650 19.4.1 Timing analysis 651 19.4.2 Power analysis 652 19.4.3 Glitching and differential fault analysis 655 19.4.4 Rowhammer, CLKscrew and Plundervolt 656 19.4.5 Meltdown, Spectre and other enclave side channels 657 19.5 Environmental side channels 659 19.5.1 Acoustic side channels 659 19.5.2 Optical side channels 661 19.5.3 Other side-channels 661 19.6 Social side channels 663 19.7 Summary 663 Research problems 664 Further reading 664 Chapter 20 Advanced Cryptographic Engineering 667 20.1 Introduction 667 20.2 Full-disk encryption 668 20.3 Signal 670 20.4 Tor 674 20.5 HSMs 677 20.5.1 The xor-to-null-key attack 677 20.5.2 Attacks using backwards compatibility and time-memory tradeoffs 678 20.5.3 Differential protocol attacks 679 20.5.4 The EMV attack 681 20.5.5 Hacking the HSMs in CAs and clouds 681 20.5.6 Managing HSM risks 681 20.6 Enclaves 682 20.7 Blockchains 685 20.7.1 Wallets 688 20.7.2 Miners 689 20.7.3 Smart contracts 689 20.7.4 Off-chain payment mechanisms 691 20.7.5 Exchanges, cryptocrime and regulation 692 20.7.6 Permissioned blockchains 695 20.8 Crypto dreams that failed 695 20.9 Summary 696 Research problems 698 Further reading 698 Chapter 21 Network Attack and Defence 699 21.1 Introduction 699 21.2 Network protocols and service denial 701 21.2.1 BGP security 701 21.2.2 DNS security 703 21.2.3 UDP, TCP, SYN floods and SYN reflection 704 21.2.4 Other amplifiers 705 21.2.5 Other denial-of-service attacks 706 21.2.6 Email - from spies to spammers 706 21.3 The malware menagerie - Trojans, worms and RATs 708 21.3.1 Early history of malware 709 21.3.2 The Internet worm 710 21.3.3 Further malware evolution 711 21.3.4 How malware works 713 21.3.5 Countermeasures 714 21.4 Defense against network attack 715 21.4.1 Filtering: firewalls, censorware and wiretaps 717 21.4.1.1 Packet filtering 718 21.4.1.2 Circuit gateways 718 21.4.1.3 Application proxies 719 21.4.1.4 Ingress versus egress filtering 719 21.4.1.5 Architecture 720 21.4.2 Intrusion detection 722 21.4.2.1 Types of intrusion detection 722 21.4.2.2 General limitations of intrusion detection 724 21.4.2.3 Specific problems detecting network attacks 724 21.5 Cryptography: the ragged boundary 725 21.5.1 SSH 726 21.5.2 Wireless networking at the periphery 727 21.5.2.1 WiFi 727 21.5.2.2 Bluetooth 728 21.5.2.3 HomePlug 729 21.5.2.4 VPNs 729 21.6 CAs and PKI 730 21.7 Topology 733 21.8 Summary 734 Research problems 734 Further reading 735 Chapter 22 Phones 737 22.1 Introduction 737 22.2 Attacks on phone networks 738 22.2.1 Attacks on phone-call metering 739 22.2.2 Attacks on signaling 742 22.2.3 Attacks on switching and configuration 743 22.2.4 Insecure end systems 745 22.2.5 Feature interaction 746 22.2.6 VOIP 747 22.2.7 Frauds by phone companies 748 22.2.8 Security economics of telecomms 749 22.3 Going mobile 750 22.3.1 GSM 751 22.3.2 3G 755 22.3.3 4G 757 22.3.4 5G and beyond 758 22.3.5 General MNO failings 760 22.4 Platform security 761 22.4.1 The Android app ecosystem 763 22.4.1.1 App markets and developers 764 22.4.1.2 Bad Android implementations 764 22.4.1.3 Permissions 766 22.4.1.4 Android malware 767 22.4.1.5 Ads and third-party services 768 22.4.1.6 Pre-installed apps 770 22.4.2 Apple's app ecosystem 770 22.4.3 Cross-cutting issues 774 22.5 Summary 775 Research problems 776 Further reading 776 Chapter 23 Electronic and Information Warfare 777 23.1 Introduction 777 23.2 Basics 778 23.3 Communications systems 779 23.3.1 Signals intelligence techniques 781 23.3.2 Attacks on communications 784 23.3.3 Protection techniques 785 23.3.3.1 Frequency hopping 786 23.3.3.2 DSSS 787 23.3.3.3 Burst communications 788 23.3.3.4 Combining covertness and jam resistance 789 23.3.4 Interaction between civil and military uses 790 23.4 Surveillance and target acquisition 791 23.4.1 Types of radar 792 23.4.2 Jamming techniques 793 23.4.3 Advanced radars and countermeasures 795 23.4.4 Other sensors and multisensor issues 796 23.5 IFF systems 797 23.6 Improvised explosive devices 800 23.7 Directed energy weapons 802 23.8 Information warfare 803 23.8.1 Attacks on control systems 805 23.8.2 Attacks on other infrastructure 808 23.8.3 Attacks on elections and political stability 809 23.8.4 Doctrine 811 23.9 Summary 812 Research problems 813 Further reading 813 Chapter 24 Copyright and DRM 815 24.1 Introduction 815 24.2 Copyright 817 24.2.1 Software 817 24.2.2 Free software, free culture? 823 24.2.3 Books and music 827 24.2.4 Video and pay-TV 828 24.2.4.1 Typical system architecture 829 24.2.4.2 Video scrambling techniques 830 24.2.4.3 Attacks on hybrid scrambling systems 832 24.2.4.4 DVB 836 24.2.5 DVD 837 24.3 DRM on general-purpose computers 838 24.3.1 Windows media rights management 839 24.3.2 FairPlay, HTML5 and other DRM systems 840 24.3.3 Software obfuscation 841 24.3.4 Gaming, cheating, and DRM 843 24.3.5 Peer-to-peer systems 845 24.3.6 Managing hardware design rights 847 24.4 Information hiding 848 24.4.1 Watermarks and copy generation management 849 24.4.2 General information hiding techniques 849 24.4.3 Attacks on copyright marking schemes 851 24.5 Policy 854 24.5.1 The IP lobby 857 24.5.2 Who benefits? 859 24.6 Accessory control 860 24.7 Summary 862 Research problems 862 Further reading 863 Chapter 25 New Directions? 865 25.1 Introduction 865 25.2 Autonomous and remotely-piloted vehicles 866 25.2.1 Drones 866 25.2.2 Self-driving cars 867 25.2.3 The levels and limits of automation 869 25.2.4 How to hack a self-driving car 872 25.3 AI / ML 874 25.3.1 ML and security 875 25.3.2 Attacks on ML systems 876 25.3.3 ML and society 879 25.4 PETS and operational security 882 25.4.1 Anonymous messaging devices 885 25.4.2 Social support 887 25.4.3 Living off the land 890 25.4.4 Putting it all together 891 25.4.5 The name's Bond. James Bond 893 25.5 Elections 895 25.5.1 The history of voting machines 896 25.5.2 Hanging chads 896 25.5.3 Optical scan 898 25.5.4 Software independence 899 25.5.5 Why electronic elections are hard 900 25.6 Summary 904 Research problems 904 Further reading 905 Part III Chapter 26 Surveillance or Privacy? 909 26.1 Introduction 909 26.2 Surveillance 912 26.2.1 The history of government wiretapping 912 26.2.2 Call data records (CDRs) 916 26.2.3 Search terms and location data 919 26.2.4 Algorithmic processing 920 26.2.5 ISPs and CSPs 921 26.2.6 The Five Eyes' system of systems 922 26.2.7 The crypto wars 925 26.2.7.1 The back story to crypto policy 926 26.2.7.2 DES and crypto research 927 26.2.7.3 CryptoWar 1 - the Clipper chip 928 26.2.7.4 CryptoWar 2 - going spotty 931 26.2.8 Export control 934 26.3 Terrorism 936 26.3.1 Causes of political violence 936 26.3.2 The psychology of political violence 937 26.3.3 The role of institutions 938 26.3.4 The democratic response 940 26.4 Censorship 941 26.4.1 Censorship by authoritarian regimes 942 26.4.2 Filtering, hate speech and radicalisation 944 26.5 Forensics and rules of evidence 948 26.5.1 Forensics 948 26.5.2 Admissibility of evidence 950 26.5.3 What goes wrong 951 26.6 Privacy and data protection 953 26.6.1 European data protection 953 26.6.2 Privacy regulation in the USA 956 26.6.3 Fragmentation? 958 26.7 Freedom of information 960 26.8 Summary 961 Research problems 962 Further reading 962 Chapter 27 Secure Systems Development 965 27.1 Introduction 965 27.2 Risk management 966 27.3 Lessons from safety-critical systems 969 27.3.1 Safety engineering methodologies 970 27.3.2 Hazard analysis 971 27.3.3 Fault trees and threat trees 971 27.3.4 Failure modes and effects analysis 972 27.3.5 Threat modelling 973 27.3.6 Quantifying risks 975 27.4 Prioritising protection goals 978 27.5 Methodology 980 27.5.1 Top-down design 981 27.5.2 Iterative design: from spiral to agile 983 27.5.3 The secure development lifecycle 985 27.5.4 Gated development 987 27.5.5 Software as a Service 988 27.5.6 From DevOps to DevSecOps 991 27.5.6.1 The Azure ecosystem 991 27.5.6.2 The Google ecosystem 992 27.5.6.3 Creating a learning system 994 27.5.7 The vulnerability cycle 995 27.5.7.1 The CVE system 997 27.5.7.2 Coordinated disclosure 998 27.5.7.3 Security incident and event management 999 27.5.8 Organizational mismanagement of risk 1000 27.6 Managing the team 1004 27.6.1 Elite engineers 1004 27.6.2 Diversity 1005 27.6.3 Nurturing skills and attitudes 1007 27.6.4 Emergent properties 1008 27.6.5 Evolving your workflow 1008 27.6.6 And finally... 1010 27.7 Summary 1010 Research problems 1011 Further reading 1012 Chapter 28 Assurance and Sustainability 1015 28.1 Introduction 1015 28.2 Evaluation 1018 28.2.1 Alarms and locks 1019 28.2.2 Safety evaluation regimes 1019 28.2.3 Medical device safety 1020 28.2.4 Aviation safety 1023 28.2.5 The Orange book 1025 28.2.6 FIPS 140 and HSMs 1026 28.2.7 The common criteria 1026 28.2.7.1 The gory details 1027 28.2.7.2 What goes wrong with the Common Criteria 1029 28.2.7.3 Collaborative protection profiles 1031 28.2.8 The 'Principle of Maximum Complacency' 1032 28.2.9 Next steps 1034 28.3 Metrics and dynamics of dependability 1036 28.3.1 Reliability growth models 1036 28.3.2 Hostile review 1039 28.3.3 Free and open-source software 1040 28.3.4 Process assurance 1042 28.4 The entanglement of safety and security 1044 28.4.1 The electronic safety and security of cars 1046 28.4.2 Modernising safety and security regulation 1049 28.4.3 The Cybersecurity Act 2019 1050 28.5 Sustainability 1051 28.5.1 The Sales of goods directive 1052 28.5.2 New research directions 1053 28.6 Summary 1056 Research problems 1057 Further reading 1058 Chapter 29 Beyond "Computer Says No" 1059 Bibliography 1061 Index 1143

Descriere

Now that there's software in everything, how can you make anything secure? Understand how to engineer dependable systems with this newly updated classic In Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems, Third Edition Cambridge University professor Ross Anderson updates his classic textbook and teaches readers how to design, implement, and test systems to withstand both error and attack. This book became a best-seller in 2001 and helped establish the discipline of security engineering. By the second edition in 2008, underground dark markets had let the bad guys specialize and scale up; attacks were increasingly on users rather than on technology. The book repeated its success by showing how security engineers can focus on usability. Now the third edition brings it up to date for 2020. As people now go online from phones more than laptops, most servers are in the cloud, online advertising drives the Internet and social networks have taken over much human interaction, many patterns of crime and abuse are the same, but the methods have evolved. Ross Anderson explores what security engineering means in 2020, including: How the basic elements of cryptography, protocols, and access control translate to the new world of phones, cloud services, social media and the Internet of Things Who the attackers are – from nation states and business competitors through criminal gangs to stalkers and playground bullies What they do – from phishing and carding through SIM swapping and software exploits to DDoS and fake news Security psychology, from privacy through ease-of-use to deception The economics of security and dependability – why companies build vulnerable systems and governments look the other way How dozens of industries went online – well or badly How to manage security and safety engineering in a world of agile development – from reliability engineering to DevSecOps The third edition of Security Engineering ends with a grand challenge: sustainable security. As we build ever more software and connectivity into safety-critical durable goods like cars and medical devices, how do we design systems we can maintain and defend for decades? Or will everything in the world need monthly software upgrades, and become unsafe once they stop?