Algorithmic Game Theory: Third International Symposium, SAGT 2010, Athens, Greece, October 18-20, 2010, Proceedings: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, cartea 6386
Editat de Spyros Kontogiannis, Elias Koutsoupias, Paul Spirakisen Limba Engleză Paperback – 6 oct 2010
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Specificații
ISBN-13: 9783642161698
ISBN-10: 3642161693
Pagini: 359
Ilustrații: VIII, 359 p. 25 illus.
Greutate: 0.54 kg
Ediția:2010
Editura: Springer Berlin, Heidelberg
Colecția Springer
Seriile Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Information Systems and Applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI
Locul publicării:Berlin, Heidelberg, Germany
ISBN-10: 3642161693
Pagini: 359
Ilustrații: VIII, 359 p. 25 illus.
Greutate: 0.54 kg
Ediția:2010
Editura: Springer Berlin, Heidelberg
Colecția Springer
Seriile Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Information Systems and Applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI
Locul publicării:Berlin, Heidelberg, Germany
Public țintă
ResearchCuprins
When the Players Are Not Expectation Maximizers.- How Do You Like Your Equilibrium Selection Problems? Hard, or Very Hard?.- A Simplex-Like Algorithm for Fisher Markets.- Nash Equilibria in Fisher Market.- Partition Equilibrium Always Exists in Resource Selection Games.- Mixing Time and Stationary Expected Social Welfare of Logit Dynamics.- Pareto Efficiency and Approximate Pareto Efficiency in Routing and Load Balancing Games.- On Nash-Equilibria of Approximation-Stable Games.- Improved Lower Bounds on the Price of Stability of Undirected Network Design Games.- On the Rate of Convergence of Fictitious Play.- On Learning Algorithms for Nash Equilibria.- On the Structure of Weakly Acyclic Games.- A Direct Reduction from k-Player to 2-Player Approximate Nash Equilibrium.- Responsive Lotteries.- On the Existence of Optimal Taxes for Network Congestion Games with Heterogeneous Users.- Computing Stable Outcomes in Hedonic Games.- A Perfect Price Discrimination Market Model with Production, and a (Rational) Convex Program for It.- The Computational Complexity of Trembling Hand Perfection and Other Equilibrium Refinements.- Complexity of Safe Strategic Voting.- Bottleneck Congestion Games with Logarithmic Price of Anarchy.- Single-Parameter Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public Valuations.- On the Efficiency of Markets with Two-Sided Proportional Allocation Mechanisms.- Braess’s Paradox for Flows over Time.- The Price of Anarchy in Network Creation Games Is (Mostly) Constant.- Truthful Fair Division.- No Regret Learning in Oligopolies: Cournot vs. Bertrand.- On the Complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and Strong Equilibria.- 2-Player Nash and Nonsymmetric Bargaining Games: Algorithms and Structural Properties.- On the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Linear BottleneckCongestion Games.- Minimal Subsidies in Expense Sharing Games.