Tournament Solutions and Majority Voting: Studies in Economic Theory, cartea 7
Autor J. -Francois Laslieren Limba Engleză Paperback – 28 sep 2011
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Specificații
ISBN-13: 9783642645617
ISBN-10: 3642645615
Pagini: 276
Ilustrații: XIV, 256 p.
Dimensiuni: 155 x 235 x 14 mm
Greutate: 0.39 kg
Ediția:Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1997
Editura: Springer Berlin, Heidelberg
Colecția Springer
Seria Studies in Economic Theory
Locul publicării:Berlin, Heidelberg, Germany
ISBN-10: 3642645615
Pagini: 276
Ilustrații: XIV, 256 p.
Dimensiuni: 155 x 235 x 14 mm
Greutate: 0.39 kg
Ediția:Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1997
Editura: Springer Berlin, Heidelberg
Colecția Springer
Seria Studies in Economic Theory
Locul publicării:Berlin, Heidelberg, Germany
Public țintă
ResearchCuprins
Organisation of the Book.- 1 Generalities.- 1.1 Definitions and Notations ..- 1.2 Finite Tournaments.- 1.3 Decomposition.- 1.4 Regularity.- 1.5 Useful Notions about General Binary Relations.- 2 Tournament Solutions.- 2.1 Majority Voting and Tournaments.- 2.2 Solution Concepts.- 2.3 Monotonicity, Strong Superset Property and Independence of Losers.- 2.4 Composition-Consistency and Regularity.- 2.5 Composition-Consistent Hulls.- 3 Scoring and Ranking Methods.- 3.1 Copeland Solution.- 3.2 Iterative Matrix Solutions.- 3.3 Markov Solution.- 3.4 Slater Solution.- 4 Multivariate Descriptions.- 4.1 Complete Euclidean Description.- 4.2 Multidimensional Scaling.- 5 Covering.- 5.1 Covering Relation and Uncovered Set.- 5.2 Iterations of the Uncovered Set.- 5.3 Dutta’s Minimal Covering Set.- 5.4 Weak Covering à la Laffond and Lainé.- 5.5 Weak Covering à la Levchenkov.- 6 Tournament Game.- 6.1 Tournament Game in Pure Strategies.- 6.2 Tournament Game in Mixed Strategies.- 6.3 Properties of the Bipartisan Set.- 6.4 Method of the Minimal Gain.- 6.5 Interpretation of Tournament Games.- 7 The Contestation Process.- 7.1 Banks’ Solution.- 7.2 The Tournament Equilibrium Set.- 8 Tournament Algebras and Binary Trees.- 8.1 Definition of a Tournament Algebra.- 8.2 Binary Trees.- 8.3 An Algebraic Solution: The Top-Cycle.- 8.4 An Algebraic Solution: The Banks’ set.- 8.5 Properties of Algebraic Solutions.- 9 Copeland Value of a Solution.- 9.1 Definition of the Copeland Value.- 9.2 Computation of Some Copeland Values.- 10 From Tournaments to Choice and Voting.- 10.1 Generalized Tournaments.- 10.2 Social Choice.- 10.3 Voting with Mediators.- 10.4 Voting with Agendas.- Annex — Summary Tables.- A.1 Relations between the Main Solutions.- A.2 Properties of the Main Solutions.- A.3 Games andTournaments Concepts.- A.4 An Example.- Index of Main Notations.- References.