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Algorithmic Game Theory: 15th International Symposium, SAGT 2022, Colchester, UK, September 12–15, 2022, Proceedings de Panagiotis Kanellopoulos

Algorithmic Game Theory: 15th International Symposium, SAGT 2022, Colchester, UK, September 12–15, 2022, Proceedings: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, cartea 13584

Editat de Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou, Alexandros Voudouris
en Limba Engleză Paperback – 14 sep 2022
This book constitutes the proceedings of the 15th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2022, which took place in Colchester, UK, in September 2022. 
The 31 full papers included in this book were carefully reviewed and selected from 83 submissions. They were organized in topical sections as follows: Auctions, markets and mechanism design; computational aspects in games; congestion and network creation games; data sharing and learning; social choice and stable matchings.
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Specificații

ISBN-13: 9783031157134
ISBN-10: 3031157133
Pagini: 589
Ilustrații: XVI, 589 p. 68 illus., 42 illus. in color.
Dimensiuni: 155 x 235 mm
Greutate: 0.84 kg
Ediția:1st ed. 2022
Editura: Springer International Publishing
Colecția Springer
Seria Lecture Notes in Computer Science

Locul publicării:Cham, Switzerland

Cuprins

Invited Talk.- Decentralizing Information Technology: The Advent of Resource Based Systems.- Auctions, Markets and Mechanism Design.- How Bad is the Merger Paradox.- Greater Flexibility in Mechanism Design Through Altruism.- Lookahead Auctions with Pooling.- Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Procurement Auctions with Divisible Agents.- On Improved Interval Cover Mechanisms for Crowdsourcing Markets.- Explicitly Simple Near-tie Auctions.- Computational Aspects in Games.- Simultaneous Contests with Equal Sharing Allocation of Prizes: Computational Complexity and Price of Anarchy.- Complexity of Public Goods Games on Graphs.- PPAD-Complete Pure Approximate Nash Equilibria in Lipschitz Games.- Seniorities and Minimal Clearing in Financial Network Games.- Financial Networks with Singleton Liability Priorities.- Automated Equilibrium Analysis of 2 2 2 Games.- Congestion and Network Creation Games.- An Improved Bound for the Tree Conjecture in Network Creation Games.- A common generalizationof budget games and congestion games.- Cost-Sharing Games with Rank-Based Utilities.- On Tree Equilibria in Max-Distance Network Creation Games.- On the Impact of Player Capability on Congestion Games.- Data Sharing and Learning.- Learning Approximately Optimal Contracts.- Coopetition Against an Amazon.- Data Curation from Privacy-Aware Agents.- Fast Convergence of Optimistic Gradient Ascent in Network Zero-Sum Extensive Form Games.- Social Choice and Stable Matchings.- Decentralised Update Selection with Semi-Strategic Experts.- Fair ride allocation on a line.- Stable Matching with Multilayer Approval Preferences: Approvals can be Harder than Strict Preferences.- Collective Schedules: Axioms and algorithms.- Justifying Groups in Multiwinner Approval Voting.- Fairness in Temporal Slot Assignment.- Gehrlein Stable Committee with Multi-Modal Preferences. -Online Max-min Fair Allocation.- Incomplete List Setting of the Hospitals/Residents Problem with Maximally Satisfying Lower Quotas.- Strategic Voting in the Context of Stable-Matching of Teams.