The Dynamics of Norms: Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction and Decision Theory
Editat de Cristina Bicchieri, Richard Jeffrey, Brian Skyrmsen Limba Engleză Paperback – 8 apr 2009
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Specificații
ISBN-13: 9780521108744
ISBN-10: 0521108748
Pagini: 236
Ilustrații: 16 b/w illus.
Dimensiuni: 152 x 229 x 14 mm
Greutate: 0.35 kg
Editura: Cambridge University Press
Colecția Cambridge University Press
Seria Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction and Decision Theory
Locul publicării:New York, United States
ISBN-10: 0521108748
Pagini: 236
Ilustrații: 16 b/w illus.
Dimensiuni: 152 x 229 x 14 mm
Greutate: 0.35 kg
Editura: Cambridge University Press
Colecția Cambridge University Press
Seria Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction and Decision Theory
Locul publicării:New York, United States
Cuprins
1. The evolution of strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma Robert Axelrod; 2. Learning to co-operate Cristina Bicchieri; 3. On the dynamics of social norms Pier Luigi Sacco; 4. Learning and efficiency in common interest signalling games David Canning; 5. Learning on a Torus Luca Anderlini and Antonella Ianni; 6. Evolutive vs. naive Bayesian learning Immanuel M. Bomze and Jurgen Eichberger; 7. Learning and mixed strategy equilibria in evolutionary games Vincent P. Crawford; 8. Bayesian learning in games: a non-Bayesian perspective J. S. Jordan; 9. Savage-Bayesian agents play a repeated game Yaw Nyarko; 10. Chaos and the explanatory significance of equilibrium: strange attractors in evolutionary game theory Brian Skyrms.
Descriere
A 'state-of-the-art' collection of essays, presenting some of the best contemporary research into norms.