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Seeing, Knowing, and Doing: A Perceptualist Account de Robert Audi

Seeing, Knowing, and Doing: A Perceptualist Account

Autor Robert Audi
en Limba Engleză Paperback – 26 mai 2025

În centrul volumului Seeing, Knowing, and Doing stă o explorare riguroasă a modului în care percepția fundamentează nu doar experiența senzorială, ci și structurile abstracte ale cunoașterii a priori. Ne-a atras atenția în mod deosebit a doua parte a lucrării, unde Robert Audi dezvoltă o teorie a „evidenței de sine”. Spre deosebire de abordările tradiționale care separă net intuiția intelectuală de simțuri, autorul argumentează că sesizarea adevărurilor a priori funcționează analog procesului perceptiv, oferind astfel o viziune unitară asupra minții umane.

Putem afirma că acest volum reprezintă o sinteză matură a temelor recurente în opera autorului. Dacă în Epistemology Audi oferea o introducere sistematică în teoria cunoașterii, iar în Moral Perception aplica aceste concepte în sfera eticii, lucrarea de față extinde cadrul teoretic către filozofia acțiunii. Merită menționat modul în care textul clarifică distincția dintre cunoașterea modului în care se fac lucrurile și cunoașterea practică propriu-zisă, integrând percepția ca un element de ghidare rațională a mișcării și deciziei.

Ca alternativă la A Critical Introduction to the Epistemology of Perception de Ali Hasan pentru cursurile de epistemologie avansată, volumul lui Audi are avantajul de a nu se limita la o trecere în revistă a literaturii, ci de a propune un model constructiv original. În timp ce Dimitria Electra Gatzia în The Epistemology of Non-Visual Perception se concentrează pe diversitatea modalităților senzoriale, Audi prioritizează arhitectura logică și cauzală care leagă percepția de acțiunea rațională, oferind un sistem filosofic complet.

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Specificații

ISBN-13: 9780197802342
ISBN-10: 0197802346
Pagini: 244
Dimensiuni: 157 x 234 x 23 mm
Greutate: 0.36 kg
Editura: Oxford University Press
Colecția OUP USA
Locul publicării:New York, United States

De ce să citești această carte

Această monografie este esențială pentru studenții și cercetătorii în filozofia minții și epistemologie care caută o explicație coerentă a legăturii dintre simțuri și rațiune. Cititorul va câștiga o înțelegere profundă a modului în care percepția nu doar ne informează despre lume, ci ne structurează capacitatea de a acționa logic și de a înțelege adevărurile fundamentale, dincolo de simpla observație.

Despre autor

Robert Audi este profesor de filozofie la Universitatea Notre Dame și o figură centrală în epistemologia contemporană. Fost președinte al American Philosophical Association și editor al Journal of Philosophical Research, Audi a construit o carieră dedicată înțelegerii raționalității, eticii și cunoașterii. Opera sa vastă include titluri de referință precum Epistemology și Moral Perception, lucrări care au redefinit modul în care abordăm intuiționismul și justificarea credințelor. Expertiza sa în filozofia morală a lui W.D. Ross și în etica kantiană, vizibilă în volume precum Means, Ends, and Persons, îi permite să abordeze percepția dintr-o perspectivă complexă, integrând rigoarea analitică cu preocupările practice ale acțiunii umane.

Descriere

Perception is basic for human knowledge and a major concern of both epistemology and the philosophy of mind. The scholarship in this area, however, has left two important aspects of perception underexplored: its relevance to understanding a priori knowledge--traditionally conceived as independent of perception--and its role in human action. This book provides a full-scale account of perception, a theory of the a priori, and an account of how perception guides action. In exploring perception and action, it clarifies the relation between action and practical reasoning, the notion of rational action, and the relation between knowledge of the practical (of how things are done) and practical knowledge (knowing how to do things). In the first part of the book, Robert Audi lays out a theory of perception as experiential, representational, and causally connected with its objects. He argues that perception is a discriminative response to its objects; it embodies phenomenally distinctive elements; and it yields rich information that underlies human knowledge. Part Two presents a theory of self-evidence and the a priori. Audi's theory is perceptualist in that it explicates the apprehension of a priori truths by articulating its parallels to perception. The theory also unifies empirical and a priori knowledge by clarifying their reliable causal connections with their objects--connections many have thought impossible for a priori knowledge. The final part explores how perception guides action, the role of propositional knowledge in our abilities to do what we know how to do, the nature of reasons for action, the role of inference in determining it, and the overall conditions for its rationality. Addressing longstanding questions left unaddressed in the current literature, Audi's comprehensive theory of perception will appeal to scholars and students interested in philosophy of perception, mind, and epistemology.

Recenzii

Audi is one of the most distinguished and prolific analytic philosophers working today ... The argumentation in is rich and complex . . . the book represents an important contribution to current debates in epistemology and the philosophy of mind.
Seeing, Knowing and Doing is a gem. Clearly and concisely, it manages to tackle some of the deepest issues in epistemology. . . such as the nature of perception, its role in justification, the relationship between justification and knowledge, the nature and extent of the a priori, the nature of know-how and the relation between perception and action, while proposing innovative views on all these fronts.
Seeing, Knowing, and Doing offers a comprehensive picture of perception, knowledge, and agency. At its center is the idea that perception is a starting point for knowledge, as for many other epistemic and practical achievements. The book tells a complete story of the role of perception in our cognitive and epistemic lives. Wide-ranging and rigorous, it balances respect for our intuitions with theoretical consistency and completeness.
Throughout his distinguished career, Audi has reflected as deeply as anyone on the nature and role of perceptual experience as guides to belief and action, where his own reflection is informed by his penetrating account of a priori justification as grounded in self-evidence. Engaging contemporary debates on the a priori, perceptual knowledge, practical reason, know-how, and action, Seeing, Knowing, and Doing provides a first-rate elaboration of Audi's unique perspective on the normativity of experience for both belief and action.

Notă biografică

Robert Audi is internationally known for his books, articles, and lectures in ethics (including political philosophy), the theory of knowledge, the philosophy of mind and action, and the philosophy of religion. His books since 2000 include Religious Commitment and Secular Reason (Cambridge 2000), a theory of the relation between church and state and, for individuals, between religion and politics; The Architecture of Reason (Oxford 2001), a theory of rationality that provides a partial foundation for ethics; The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value (Princeton 2004), a presentation of some main elements in Audi's view in ethics; Practical Reasoning and Ethical Decision (Routledge 2006), an account of the nature and varieties of practical reasoning and its relation to moral standards; Moral Value and Human Diversity (Oxford 2007), a non-technical presentation of major approaches in ethics and value theory; Rationality and Religious Commitment(Oxford 2011), a comprehensive monograph in philosophy of religion (derived from the Wilde Lectures given much earlier at Oxford); Moral Perception (Princeton 2013), a theory of perceptual moral knowledge and its relation to emotion, intuition, and objectivity in ethics; Seeing, Knowing, and Doing (Oxford 2020), an account of perception of the physical, apprehension of the abstract, and how both underlie our actions; Of Moral Conduct: A Theory of Obligation, Reasons, and Value (Cambridge 2023); and (as Editor) The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (Cambridge, 3rd ed. 2015). Audi is a past president of the American Philosophical Association, a former director of National Endowment for the Humanities Seminars and Institutes, a recipient of prizes and honors for lifetime contributions to philosophy, a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and presently John A. O'Brien Professor of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame. His B. A. is from Colgate University, his Ph.D.from the University of Michigan.

Cuprins

  • Preface
  • Acknowledgments
  • Introduction
  • Part One: Perception
  • Chapter 1 Perception and Perceptual Belief: Seeing and Knowing the Physical World
  • I. Perception Broadly Conceived
  • II. Four Structurally Distinct Cases of Perception
  • III. The Representational Character of Perception
  • Chapter 2 Dimensions of Perceptual Content
  • I. Three Categories of Perceptual Content
  • II. Singular Reference and the Possible Role of Russellian Propositions
  • III. Perception and Belief: Cognitive and Conceptual Aspects
  • Chapter 3 Perceptual Levels and their Action-Theoretic Counterparts
  • I. Perception and Action: The Structural Analogy
  • II. Constitutive Elements in the Visual Perception of Physical Objects
  • III. Awareness of Events and Abstract Entities
  • IV. The Epistemological Significance of Perceptual Levels
  • V. Is Perception Theory-Laden?
  • VI. The Importance of "Background Beliefs" and Perceptual Levels
  • VII. Aspectual Perception, Inference, and Recognition
  • Chapter 4 Perception as a Source of Knowledge and Justification
  • I. Perceptual Knowledge
  • II. The Hierarchical Character of Perception
  • III. Perceptual Justification: External and Internal Dimensions
  • IV. The Perceptibility of Normative Properties
  • Chapter 5 Reasons, Perceptual Grounds, and Normative Explanation
  • I. The Diversity of Reasons for Belief
  • II. Reasons as Distinguished from Grounds
  • III. Reasons and Grounds for Belief: The Practical Analogy
  • IV. Reasons as Explanations
  • V. Normative Reasons and their Grounds
  • Chapter 6 The Autonomy of Justification
  • I. Epistemological Internalism
  • II. Does Knowledge Entail Justification?
  • III. The Practice-Relativity of Justification
  • IV. An Integrated View of Knowledge and Justification
  • V. The Disjunctivist Challenge
  • VI. The Elusive Notion of the Content of Perceptual Belief
  • VII. Perception and Singular Reference
  • Part Two: Perception and the A Priori
  • Chapter 7 Perception, Intuition, and Apprehension
  • I. Perception and Intuition
  • II. Structural Parallels between Intuitional and Perceptional Discourse
  • III. Intuitions as Evidential Cognitions: Two Intuitionist Traditions
  • IV. Intuitions as Apprehensions
  • Chapter 8 Toward a Theory of the A Priori
  • I. The Concept of Self-Evidence
  • II. Understanding as Central for Knowledge of the Self-evident
  • III. Understanding and Imagination
  • IV. Major Elements in the Understanding of Propositions
  • V. Degrees of Understanding and Propositional Justification
  • VI. Comprehensional Adequacy
  • VII. Obstacles to Comprehension
  • Chapter 9 Apriority, Disputability, and Necessity
  • I. Self-Evidence and Provability
  • II. Can Rational Disagreement Extend to the Self-Evident?
  • III. The Self-Evident, the Obvious, and the Credible
  • IV. Apprehension of Abstract Entities
  • V. Apriority and Necessity
  • Part Three: Practical Knowledge
  • Chapter 10 Knowledge, Belief, and Action
  • I. Belief and Action
  • II. Two Orders of Cognitive Disposition
  • III. Belief and Knowledge, Intention and Action
  • Chapter 11 Knowing, Reasoning, and Doing
  • I. Intellectualism as a Perspective on Action
  • II. Practical Knowledge and Knowledge of the Practical
  • III. Virtual Knowledge: A Neglected Category
  • IV. The Place of Knowledge in Practical Reasoning
  • Chapter 12 Inference and Its Role in Rational Action
  • I. Inference and Inferential Belief
  • II. Inference, Reasoning, and Premise-Based Belief-Formation
  • III. Reasoning and Rational Action
  • IV. The Scope of Rational Action
  • V. Intentionality, Knowledge, and Agency
  • Conclusion: Perception, Apprehension, and Action
  • References
  • Index