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Mind, Meaning and Metaphysics: The Philosophy and Theory of Language of Anton Marty: Primary Sources in Phenomenology, cartea 3

Editat de K. Mulligan
en Limba Engleză Paperback – 3 ian 2012

Din seria Primary Sources in Phenomenology

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Specificații

ISBN-13: 9789401067133
ISBN-10: 9401067139
Pagini: 304
Ilustrații: XII, 292 p.
Dimensiuni: 155 x 235 x 16 mm
Greutate: 0.43 kg
Ediția:Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1990
Editura: SPRINGER NETHERLANDS
Colecția Springer
Seria Primary Sources in Phenomenology

Locul publicării:Dordrecht, Netherlands

Public țintă

Research

Cuprins

Brentano and Marty on Content: A Synthesis suggested by Brentano.- 1 Brentano’s Final View.- 2 Attribution in Modo Recto and in Modo Obliquo.- 3 Object and Content.- 4 Other Intentional Attitudes.- 5 Immanent Objects and Transcendent Objects.- 6 Conclusion.- Marty’s Philosophical Grammar.- 1 Introduction.- 2 The Descriptive Psychology of Meaning: Linguistic Functions.- 3 Propositions Show What would be the Case were they True.- 4 Vagueness.- 5 Meaning Change, Inner Form and Universals.- 6 Marty and Wittgenstein: Two Conceptions of Philosophical Grammar.- Meaning and Expression: Marty and Grice on Intentional Semantics.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Philosophy of Language as a General Theory.- 3 Natural and Non-Natural Meaning.- 4 Primary and Secondary Intentions.- 5 Auto-Semantic Language Devices.- 6 Conclusion.- Marty on Form and Content in Language.- 1 Inner Speech Form in some of Marty’s Early Works.- 2 Logic, Grammar and Psychology.- 3 Form and Content in Marty’s Later Works.- 4 Some Fundamental Tenets of Universal Grammar.- Why a Proper Name has a Meaning: Marty and Landgrebe vs. Kripke.- 1 Preliminaries.- 2 Kripke’s View.- 3 The Question of the Semantic Status of Proper Names.- 4 Meaning and Lexical Meaning.- 5 Reference and Meaning in Marty.- 6 Ambiguity and Vagueness.- 7 Landgrebe’s Solution.- 8 Conclusion.- The Categorical and the Thetic Judgement Reconsidered.- 1 Marty and Transformational Grammar.- 2 Categorical and Thetic Judgements.- 3 Reinterpreting the Categorical-Thetic Distinction.- 4 Conclusion.- Classical and Modern Work on Universals: The Philosophical Background and Marty’s Contribution.- 1 Categories of Meaning vs. Categories of Expression.- 2 Relativism and Colour.- 3 Natural Non-Absolute Universals.- Marty and Magnus on Colours.- Brentano andMarty: An Inquiry into Being and Truth.- 1 Aristotle and Brentano.- 2 Existence and Reality.- 3 Bases and Operations.- 4 Collectives are Non-Real.- 5 Relations are Non-Real.- 6 Space is Non-Real.- 7 States of Affairs are Non-Real.- 8 On the Origins of our Concepts of Existence and Truth.- 9 A Correspondence Theory of Intentionality.- 10 The Ontology of Truth.- 11 Wertverhalte or Value-Contents.- 12 A Postscript on Martian Aesthetics.- Marty on Grounded Relations.- Marty on Time.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Tasks of a Philosophy of Time.- 3 Marty on the Ontology of Time.- 4 Marty on the Consciousness of Time.- 5 Conclusion.- Marty’s Theory of Space.- 1 Introduction.- 2 Marty’s Two Basic Metaphysical Theses.- 3 A Sketch of Marty’s Argument.- 4 Conclusion.- Judgement-Contents.- 1 Preliminary Remark.- 2 Conceptual Framework.- 3 Marty’s Judgement-Contents.- 4 Comments.- 5 Final Remark.- of Consciousness and States of Affairs: Daubert and Marty.- 1 Phenomenologists and Brentanists.- 2 Marty on Subjectless Sentences.- 3 Daubert’s Discussion of Marty.- 4 Shortcomings in Marty.- 5 Marty’s Theory in Phenomenological Perspective.- Marty and the Lvov-Warsaw School.- Two Letters from Marty to Husserl.- A Bibliography of Works by and on Anton Marty.- 1 Works by Marty.- 2 Works on Marty.- Index of Names.- Index of Subjects.