Cantitate/Preț
Produs

Kant on Absolute Value: A Critical Examination of Certain Key Notions in Kant's 'Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals' and of his Ontology of Personal Value: Routledge Library Editions: 18th Century Philosophy

Autor Patrick Æ. Hutchings
en Limba Engleză Hardback – 2 mai 2019
The thesis of this book, first published in 1972, is that Kant’s notions of ‘absolute worth’, the ‘unconditioned’ and ‘unconditioned worth’ are rationalistic and confused, and that they spoil his ontology of personal value and tend to subvert his splendid idea of the person as an End in himself.
Citește tot Restrânge

Toate formatele și edițiile

Toate formatele și edițiile Preț Express
Paperback (1) 32570 lei  6-8 săpt.
  Taylor & Francis – 15 noi 2020 32570 lei  6-8 săpt.
Hardback (1) 81144 lei  6-8 săpt.
  Taylor & Francis – 2 mai 2019 81144 lei  6-8 săpt.

Din seria Routledge Library Editions: 18th Century Philosophy

Preț: 81144 lei

Preț vechi: 98957 lei
-18% Nou

Puncte Express: 1217

Preț estimativ în valută:
14356 16878$ 12574£

Carte tipărită la comandă

Livrare economică 28 ianuarie-11 februarie 26

Preluare comenzi: 021 569.72.76

Specificații

ISBN-13: 9780367135850
ISBN-10: 036713585X
Pagini: 348
Dimensiuni: 156 x 234 x 21 mm
Greutate: 0.66 kg
Ediția:1
Editura: Taylor & Francis
Colecția Routledge
Seria Routledge Library Editions: 18th Century Philosophy

Locul publicării:Oxford, United Kingdom

Cuprins

1. Kant, Harris and the Absolute Value  2. Kant, Harris and the Absolute or Sovereign Good  3. The Argument in Kant: I  4. The Argument in Kant: II  5. The Strange New Doctrine  6. The Ends of Reason, of Life and of Duty  7. Virtue and Rewards  8. Interest or Disinterestedness at the Root of Moral Conduct?  9. Kant’s Ontology of Personal Value: A False Absolute  10. Rationality as Value: Towards a Humanistic Ontology

Descriere

The thesis of this book, first published in 1972, is that Kant’s notions of ‘absolute worth’, the ‘unconditioned’ and ‘unconditioned worth’ are rationalistic and confused, and that they spoil his ontology of personal value and tend to subvert his splendid idea of the person as an End in himself.