Contemporary
debates on free will are numerous and multifaceted. According to
compatibilists, it is possible for an agent to be determined in all her choices
and actions and still be free. Incompatibilists, on the other hand, think that
the existence of free will is incompatible with the truth of determinism. There
are also two dominant conceptions of the nature of free will. According to the
first, it is primarily a function of being able to do otherwise than one in
fact does. The second approach focuses on issues of sourcehood, holding
that free will is primarily a function of an agent being the source of her actions
in a particular way.

This book guides the student through all these debates, demarcating the
different conceptions of free will, exploring the relationships between them,
and examining how they relate to the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists.
In the process, it addresses a number of other views, including revisionism and
free will scepticism. This is the ideal introduction to the contemporary
debates for students at all levels.