Essays on Ethics, Social Behaviour, and Scientific Explanation: Theory and Decision Library, cartea 12
Autor J.C. Harsanyien Limba Engleză Paperback – 30 sep 1980
Din seria Theory and Decision Library
- 15%
Preț: 618.03 lei -
Preț: 368.05 lei - 18%
Preț: 1183.70 lei - 18%
Preț: 1280.90 lei - 18%
Preț: 913.45 lei - 18%
Preț: 1186.88 lei -
Preț: 376.75 lei -
Preț: 368.23 lei - 15%
Preț: 618.34 lei - 15%
Preț: 615.05 lei -
Preț: 384.48 lei - 18%
Preț: 1771.77 lei - 15%
Preț: 620.86 lei - 15%
Preț: 621.48 lei - 18%
Preț: 1181.14 lei - 15%
Preț: 611.27 lei -
Preț: 368.79 lei -
Preț: 380.09 lei - 18%
Preț: 912.69 lei -
Preț: 374.34 lei - 15%
Preț: 621.97 lei -
Preț: 383.28 lei - 15%
Preț: 671.94 lei - 18%
Preț: 1170.67 lei - 18%
Preț: 924.69 lei -
Preț: 370.46 lei -
Preț: 381.19 lei - 18%
Preț: 2385.36 lei - 18%
Preț: 916.80 lei - 18%
Preț: 1185.07 lei -
Preț: 384.13 lei - 20%
Preț: 621.88 lei - 15%
Preț: 616.95 lei - 18%
Preț: 1184.61 lei
Preț: 906.80 lei
Preț vechi: 1105.86 lei
-18% Nou
Puncte Express: 1360
Preț estimativ în valută:
160.46€ • 188.16$ • 140.92£
160.46€ • 188.16$ • 140.92£
Carte tipărită la comandă
Livrare economică 31 ianuarie-14 februarie 26
Preluare comenzi: 021 569.72.76
Specificații
ISBN-13: 9789027711861
ISBN-10: 9027711860
Pagini: 272
Ilustrații: 278 p.
Dimensiuni: 155 x 235 x 14 mm
Greutate: 0.39 kg
Ediția:Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1980
Editura: SPRINGER NETHERLANDS
Colecția Springer
Seria Theory and Decision Library
Locul publicării:Dordrecht, Netherlands
ISBN-10: 9027711860
Pagini: 272
Ilustrații: 278 p.
Dimensiuni: 155 x 235 x 14 mm
Greutate: 0.39 kg
Ediția:Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1980
Editura: SPRINGER NETHERLANDS
Colecția Springer
Seria Theory and Decision Library
Locul publicării:Dordrecht, Netherlands
Public țintă
ResearchCuprins
A / Ethics and Welfare Economics.- I. Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-Taking.- II. Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility.- III. Ethics in Terms of Hypothetical Imperatives.- IV. Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls’s Theory.- V. Nonlinear Social Welfare Functions: Do Welfare Economists Have a Special Exemption from Bayesian Rationality?.- B / Rational-Choice and Game Theoretical Models of Social Behavior.- VI. Advances in Understanding Rational Behavior.- VII. Rational-Choice Models of Political Behavior vs. Functionalist and Conformist Theories.- VIII. Game Theory and the Analysis of International Conflicts.- IX. Measurement of Social Power, Opportunity Costs, and the Theory of Two-Person Bargaining Games.- X. Measurement of Social Power in n-Person Reciprocal Power Situations.- XI. A Bargaining Model for Social Status in Informal Groups and Formal Organizations.- C / Scientific Explanation.- XII. Explanation and Comparative Dynamics in Social Science.- XIII. Popper’s Improbability Criterion for the Choice of Scientific Hypotheses.