Economic Analysis of Information and Contracts: Essays in Honor of John E. Butterworth
Editat de Gerald A. Feltham, Amin H. Amershi, William T. Ziembaen Limba Engleză Paperback – 13 oct 2011
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Specificații
ISBN-13: 9789401077026
ISBN-10: 9401077029
Pagini: 436
Ilustrații: XVI, 416 p.
Dimensiuni: 155 x 235 x 23 mm
Greutate: 0.61 kg
Ediția:Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1988
Editura: SPRINGER NETHERLANDS
Colecția Springer
Locul publicării:Dordrecht, Netherlands
ISBN-10: 9401077029
Pagini: 436
Ilustrații: XVI, 416 p.
Dimensiuni: 155 x 235 x 23 mm
Greutate: 0.61 kg
Ediția:Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1988
Editura: SPRINGER NETHERLANDS
Colecția Springer
Locul publicării:Dordrecht, Netherlands
Public țintă
ResearchCuprins
I: Introduction.- John E. Butterworth’s Pioneering Contributions to the Accounting and Information Economics Literature.- to the Research Papers in this Volume.- II: Information Evaluation in Multiperson Contexts.- 1. Blackwell Informativeness and Sufficient Statistics with Applications to Financial Markets and Multiperson Agencies.- 2. The Social Value of Public Information in Production Economies.- 3. Costly Public Information: Optimality and Comparative Statics.- 4. Value of Information in Bimatrix Games.- III: Contracting in Agencies Under Moral Hazard.- 5. The Principal/Agent Problem—Numerical Solutions.- 6. Explorations in the Theory of Single- and Multiple-Agent Agencies.- 7. Sequential Choice Under Moral Hazard.- 8. Risk Sharing and Valuation Under Moral Hazard.- IV: Contracting in Agencies with Private Information.- 9. Communication of Private Information in Capital Markets: Contingent Contracts and Verified Reports.- 10. Managerial Compensation: Linear-Sharing vs. Bonus-Incentive Plans under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection.- 11. Intrafirm Resource Allocation and Discretionary Actions.- 12. Accountants’ Loss Functions and Induced Preferences for Conservatism.- Author Index.