Discourses on Livy
Autor Niccolo Machiavellien Limba Engleză Paperback
În cadrul programelor de studii politice și de istorie a ideilor, Discourses on Livy ocupă un loc central, fiind textul care nuanțează și, în multe privințe, completează perspectiva oferită de faimosul The Prince. Dacă în The Prince autorul se concentra pe autoritatea monarhică, în această lucrare, scrisă în jurul anului 1517, Niccolo Machiavelli explorează fundamentele republicane și mecanismele care permit unui stat să rămână liber și prosper pe termen lung. Subliniem faptul că această ediție din seria Oxford World's Classics propune o traducere modernă, menită să corecteze erorile de interpretare istorică cauzate de versiunile anterioare mai puțin riguroase.
Descoperim aici o analiză sistematică a istoriei Romei, bazată pe primele zece cărți ale lui Titus Livius, prin care Machiavelli demonstrează că succesul politic nu este rodul hazardului, ci al învățămintelor extrase din trecut. Ritmul textului este unul analitic, autorul alternând între exemplele antice și realitățile politice ale Florenței renascentiste. Suntem de părere că această lucrare este esențială pentru a înțelege conceptul de „vârteje” ale puterii și ciclurile politice prin care trec popoarele. Față de abordarea tactică și adesea brutală din The Art of War, Discourses on Livy oferă o viziune strategică asupra binelui comun și a virtuții cetățenești.
Ca alternativă la The Discourses (ediția Penguin), acest volum din Oxford World's Classics aduce avantajul unui aparat critic dens, care plasează textul în contextul umanismului italian. Este o lectură obligatorie pentru a depăși eticheta simplistă de „machiavelism” și pentru a înțelege de ce autorul este considerat părintele științei politice moderne.
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Specificații
ISBN-10: 1496165144
Pagini: 226
Dimensiuni: 152 x 229 x 12 mm
Greutate: 0.31 kg
Editura: CREATESPACE
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De ce să citești această carte
Recomandăm această carte studenților la științe politice și istorie care doresc să înțeleagă rădăcinile republicanismului modern. Cititorul câștigă o perspectivă profundă asupra modului în care instituțiile pot preveni tirania și cum istoria poate fi folosită ca instrument de prognoză politică. Este volumul care demonstrează că Machiavelli nu a fost doar un teoretician al puterii absolute, ci și un apărător al libertății civice.
Despre autor
Niccolo Machiavelli a fost un diplomat, filozof și scriitor florentin, considerat fondatorul științei politice moderne. Cariera sa publică în Republica Florența, unde a servit ca secretar al celei de-a doua cancelarii, i-a oferit acces direct la mecanismele puterii și la figuri politice marcante ale Renașterii. După revenirea familiei Medici la putere, Machiavelli s-a retras din viața publică, perioadă în care a redactat marile sale tratate politice. Opera sa, marcată de un realism tranșant, analizează etica politică și arta guvernării, influențând decisiv gândirea occidentală ulterioară.
Descriere scurtă
Descriere
Discourses on Livy (1531) is as essential to an understanding of Machiavelli as his famous treatise, The Prince. Equally controversial, it reveals his fundamental preference for a republican state. Comparing the practice of the ancient Romans with that of his contemporaries provided Machiavelli with a consistent point of view in all his works. Machiavelli's close analysis of Livy's history of Rome led him to advance his most original and outspoken view of politics - the belief that a healthy body politic was characterized by social friction and conflict rather than by rigid stability. His discussion of conspiracies in Discourses on Livy is one of the most sophisticated treatments of archetypal political upheaval every written. In an age of increasing political absolutism, Machiavelli's theories became a dangerous ideology.This new translation is richly annotated, providing the contemporary reader with sufficient historical, linguistic, and political information to understand and interpret the revolutionary affirmations Machiavelli made, based on the historical evidence he found in Livy.The complete Livy in English, available in five volumes from Oxford World's Classics. ABOUT THE SERIES: For over 100 years Oxford World's Classics has made available the widest range of literature from around the globe. Each affordable volume reflects Oxford's commitment to scholarship, providing the most accurate text plus a wealth of other valuable features, including expert introductions by leading authorities, helpful notes to clarify the text, up-to-date bibliographies for further study, and much more.
Recenzii
Notă biografică
Cuprins
Introduction by Tom Butler-Bowdon xvii
Discourses On Livy xxv
Machiavelli's dedication to Zanobi Buondelmonti and Cosimo Rucellai xxxvii
BOOK I 1
PREFACE 3
CHAPTER I Of the beginnings of Cities in general, and in particular of that of Rome 7
CHAPTER II Of the various kinds of Government; and to which of them the Roman Commonwealth belonged 12
CHAPTER III Of the accidents which led in Rome to the creation of Tribunes of the People; whereby the Republic was made more perfect 21
CHAPTER IV That the dissensions between the Senate and Commons of Rome, made Rome free and powerful 23
CHAPTER V Whether the guardianship of public freedom is safer in the hands of the Commons or of the Nobles; and whether those who seek to acquire power or they who seek to maintain it are the greater cause of commotions 26
CHAPTER VI Whether it was possible in Rome to contrive such a Government as would have composed the differences between the Commons and the Senate 29
CHAPTER VII That to preserve liberty in a State there must exist the right to accuse 36
CHAPTER VIII That calumny is as hurtful in a Commonwealth as the power to accuse is useful 41
CHAPTER IX That to give new Institutions to a Commonwealth, or to reconstruct old Institutions on an entirely new basis, must be the work of one Man 45
CHAPTER X That in proportion as the founder of a Kingdom or Commonwealth merits praise, he who founds a Tyranny deserves blame 49
CHAPTER XI Of the Religion of the Romans 54
CHAPTER XII That it is of much moment to make account of Religion; and that Italy, through the Roman Church, being wanting therein, has been ruined 59
CHAPTER XIII Of the use the Romans made of Religion in giving Institutions to their City, in carrying out their enterprises, and in quelling tumults 63
CHAPTER XIV That the Romans interpreted the auspices to meet the occasion; and made a prudent show of observing the rites of Religion even when forced to disregard them; and any who rashly slighted Religion they punished 66
CHAPTER XV How the Samnites, as a last resource in their broken fortunes, had recourse to Religion 69
CHAPTER XVI That a People accustomed to live under a Prince, if by any accident it become free, can hardly preserve that freedom 71
CHAPTER XVII That a corrupt People obtaining freedom can hardly preserve it 76
CHAPTER XVIII How a Free Government existing in a corrupt City may be preserved, or not existing may be created 79
CHAPTER XIX After a strong Prince a weak Prince may maintain himself: but after one weak Prince no Kingdom can stand a second 84
CHAPTER XX That the consecutive reigns of two valiant Princes produce great results: and that well-ordered Commonwealths are assured of a succession of valiant Rulers by whom their power and growth are rapidly extended 87
CHAPTER XXI That it is a great reproach to a Prince or to a Commonwealth to be without a National Army 88
CHAPTER XXII What is to be noted in the combat of the three Roman Horatii and the three Alban Curiatii 90
CHAPTER XXIII That we should never hazard our whole fortunes where we put not forth our entire strength; for which reason to guard a defile is often hurtful 91
CHAPTER XXIV That well-ordered States always provide rewards and punishments for their Citizens; and never set off deserts against misdeeds 94
CHAPTER XXV That he who would reform the institutions of a free State, must retain at least the semblance of old ways 96
CHAPTER XXVI A new Prince in a city or province of which he has taken possession, ought to make everything new 97
CHAPTER XXVII That Men seldom know how to be wholly good or wholly bad 98
CHAPTER XXVIII Whence it came that the Romans were less ungrateful to their citizens than were the Athenians 100
CHAPTER XXIX Whether a People or a Prince is the more ungrateful 102
CHAPTER XXX How Princes and Commonwealths may avoid the vice of ingratitude; and how a Captain or Citizen may escape being undone by it 106
CHAPTER XXXI That the Roman Captains were never punished with extreme severity for misconduct; and where loss resulted to the Republic merely through their ignorance or want of judgment, were not punished at all 109
CHAPTER XXXII That a Prince or Commonwealth should not delay conferring benefits until they are themselves in difficulties 111
CHAPTER XXXIII When a mischief has grown up in, or against a State, it is safer to temporize with than to meet it with violence 113
CHAPTER XXXIV That the authority of the Dictator did good and not harm to the Roman Republic: and that it is not those Powers which are given by the free suffrages of the People, but those which ambitious Citizens usurp for themselves, that are pernicious to a State 116
CHAPTER XXXV Why the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, although brought about by the free and open suffrage of the Citizens, was hurtful to the liberties of that Republic 120
CHAPTER XXXVI That Citizens who have held the higher offices of a Commonwealth should not disdain the lower 123
CHAPTER XXXVII Of the mischief bred in Rome by the Agrarian Law: and how it is a great source of disorder in a Commonwealth to pass a law opposed to ancient usage and with stringent retrospective effect 124
CHAPTER XXXVIII That weak Republics are irresolute and undecided; and that the course they may take depends more on Necessity than Choice 129
CHAPTER XXXIX That often the same accidents are seen to befall different Nations 133
CHAPTER XL Of the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and what therein is to be noted. Wherein among other matters is shown how the same causes may lead to the safety or to the ruin of a Commonwealth 135
CHAPTER XLI That it is unwise to pass at a bound from leniency to severity, or to a haughty bearing from a humble 143
CHAPTER XLII How easily men become corrupted 144
CHAPTER XLIII That men fighting in their own cause make Good and resolute Soldiers 145
CHAPTER XLIV That the Multitude is helpless without a head; and that we should not with the same breath threaten and ask leave 146
CHAPTER XLV That it is of evil example, especially in the Maker of a law, not to observe the law when made; and that daily to renew acts of injustice in a City is most hurtful to the Governor 148
CHAPTER XLVI That men climb from one step of ambition to another, seeking at first to escape injury and then to injure others 150
CHAPTER XLVII That though men deceive themselves in generalities, in particulars they judge truly 153
CHAPTER XLVIII He who would not have an office bestowed on some worthless or wicked person, should contrive that it be solicited by one who is utterly worthless and wicked, or else by one who is in the highest degree noble and good 158
CHAPTER XLIX That if Cities which, like Rome, had their beginning in freedom, have had difficulty in framing such laws as would preserve their Freedom, Cities which at the first have been in subjection will find this almost impossible 158
CHAPTER L That neither any Council nor any Magistrate should have power to bring the Government of a City to a stay 162
CHAPTER LI What a Prince or Republic does of necessity, should seem to be done by choice 164
CHAPTER LII That to check the arrogance of a Citizen who is growing too powerful in a State, there is no safer method, or less open to objection, than to forestall him in those ways whereby he seeks to advance himself 165
CHAPTER LIII That the People, deceived by a false show of advantage, often desire what would be their ruin; and that large hopes and brave promises easily move them 168
CHAPTER LIV Of the boundless Authority which a great man may use to restrain an excited Multitude 173
CHAPTER LV That Government is easily carried on in a City wherein the body of the People is not corrupted; and that a Princedom is impossible where equality prevails, and a Republic where it does not 175
CHAPTER LVI That when great calamities are about to befall a City or Country, signs are seen to presage, and seers arise who foretell them 181
CHAPTER LVII That the People are strong collectively, but individually weak 182
CHAPTER LVIII That a People is wiser and more constant than a Prince 184
CHAPTER LIX To what Leagues or Alliances we may most trust; whether those we make with Commonwealths or those we make with Princes 191
CHAPTER LX That the Consulship and all the other Magistracies in Rome were given without respect to Age 194
BOOK II 197
PREFACE 199
CHAPTER I Whether the Empire acquired by the Romans was more due to Valour or to Fortune 205
CHAPTER II With what Nations the Romans had to contend, and how stubborn these were in defending their Freedom 210
CHAPTER III That Rome became great by destroying the Cities which lay round about her, and by readily admitting strangers to the rights of Citizenship 219
CHAPTER IV That Commonwealths have followed three methods for extending their power 221
CHAPTER V That changes in Sects and Tongues, and the happening of Floods and Pestilences, obliterate the memory of the past 228
CHAPTER VI Of the methods followed by the Romans in making War 231
CHAPTER VII Of the quantity of land assigned by the Romans to each colonist 234
CHAPTER VIII Why certain Nations leave their ancestral Seats and overflow the Countries of others 235
CHAPTER IX Of the Causes which commonly give rise to wars between States 240
CHAPTER X That contrary to the vulgar opinion, Money is not the sinews of War 242
CHAPTER XI That it were unwise to ally yourself a Prince who has reputation rather than Strength 247
CHAPTER XII Whether when Invasion is imminent it is better to anticipate or to await it 248
CHAPTER XIII That Men rise from humble to high fortunes rather by Fraud than by Force 254
CHAPTER XIV That Men often err in thinking they can subdue Pride by Humility 257
CHAPTER XV That weak States are always dubious in their resolves; and that tardy resolves are always hurtful 259
CHAPTER XVI That the Soldiers of our days depart widely from the methods of ancient Warfare 263
CHAPTER XVII What importance the Armies of the present day should allow to Artillery; and whether the commonly received opinion concerning it be just 268
CHAPTER XVIII That the authority of the Romans and the example of ancient warfare should make us hold Foot Soldiers of more account than Horse 277
CHAPTER XIX That Acquisitions made by ill-governed States and such as follow not the valiant methods of the Romans, tend rather to their ruin than to their aggrandizement 284
CHAPTER XX Of the dangers incurred by Princes or Republics who resort to Auxiliary or Mercenary Arms 290
CHAPTER XXI That Capua was the first City to which the Romans sent a Prætor; nor there, until four hundred years after they began to make war 293
CHAPTER XXII That in matters of moment Men often judge amiss 296
CHAPTER XXIII That in chastising their Subjects when circumstances required it the Romans always avoided half-measures 299
CHAPTER XXIV That, commonly, Fortresses do much more harm than good 305
CHAPTER XXV That he who attacks a City divided against itself, must not think to get possession of it through its divisions 315
CHAPTER XXVI That Taunts and Abuse breed hatred against him who uses them, without yielding him any advantage 317
CHAPTER XXVII That prudent Princes and Republics should be content to have obtained a victory; for, commonly, when they are not, theft-victory turns to defeat 320
CHAPTER XXVIII That to neglect the redress of Grievances, whether public or private, is dangerous for a Prince or Commonwealth 324
CHAPTER XXIX That Fortune obscures the minds of Men when she would not have them hinder her designs 326
CHAPTER XXX That really powerful Princes and Commonwealths do not buy Friendships with money, but with their valour and the fame of their prowess 330
CHAPTER XXXI Of the danger of trusting banished men 335
CHAPTER XXXII In how many ways the Romans gained possession of Towns 337
CHAPTER XXXIII That the Romans intrusted the Captains of their Armies with the fullest Powers 342
BOOK III 345
CHAPTER I For a Sect or Commonwealth to last long, it must often be brought back to its beginnings 347
CHAPTER II That on occasion it is wise to feign Folly 354
CHAPTER III That to preserve a newly acquired freedom we must slay the Sons of Brutus 356
CHAPTER IV That an Usurper is never safe in his Princedom while those live whom he has deprived of it 358
CHAPTER V How an Hereditary King may come to lose his Kingdom 359
CHAPTER VI Of Conspiracies 362
CHAPTER VII Why it is that changes from Freedom to Servitude, and from Servitude to Freedom, are sometimes made without bloodshed, but at other times reek with blood 393
CHAPTER VIII That he who would effect changes in a Commonwealth, must give heed to its character and condition 394
CHAPTER IX That to enjoy constant good fortune we must change with the times 398
CHAPTER X That a Captain cannot escape battle when his Enemy forces it on him at all risks 401
CHAPTER XI That one who has to contend with many, though he be weaker than they, will prevail if he can withstand their first onset 407
CHAPTER XII A prudent Captain will do what he can to make it necessary for his own Soldiers to fight, and to relieve his Enemy from that necessity 410
CHAPTER XIII Whether we may trust more to a valiant Captain with a weak Army, or to a valiant Army with a weak Captain 415
CHAPTER XIV Of the effect produced in Battle by strange and unexpected Sights or Sounds 418
CHAPTER XV That one and not many should head an Army; and why it is harmful to have more leaders than one 421
CHAPTER XVI That in times of difficulty true Worth is sought after; whereas in quiet times it is not the most deserving, but those who are recommended by wealth or connection who are most in favour 424
CHAPTER XVII That we are not to offend a Man, and then send him to fill an important Office or Command 427
CHAPTER XVIII That it is the highest quality of a Captain to be able to forestall the designs of his adversary 429
CHAPTER XIX Whether indulgence or severity be more necessary for controlling a Multitude 433
CHAPTER XX How one humane act availed more with the men of Falerii, than all the might of the Roman Arms 435
CHAPTER XXI How it happened that Hannibal pursuing a course contrary to that taken by Scipio, wrought the same results in Italy which the other achieved in Spain 437
CHAPTER XXII That the severity of Manlius Torquatus and the gentleness of Valerius Corvinus won for both the same Glory 440
CHAPTER XXIII Why Camillus was banished from Rome 447
CHAPTER XXIV That prolonged Commands brought Rome to Servitude 449
CHAPTER XXV Of the Poverty of Cincinnatus and of many other Roman Citizens 451
CHAPTER XXVI How Women are a cause of the ruin of States 453
CHAPTER XXVII How a divided City may be reunited, and how it is a false opinion that to hold Cities in subjection they must be kept divided 455
CHAPTER XXVIII That a Republic must keep an eye on what its Citizens are about; since often the seeds of a Tyranny lie hidden under a semblance of generous deeds 459
CHAPTER XXIX That the faults of a People are due to its Prince 461
CHAPTER XXX That a Citizen who seeks by his personal influence to render signal service to his Country, must first stand clear of Envy. How a City should prepare for its defence on the approach of an Enemy 463
CHAPTER XXXI That strong Republics and valiant Men preserve through every change the same spirit and bearing 467
CHAPTER XXXII Of the methods which some have used to make Peace impossible 472
CHAPTER XXXIII That to insure victory in battle you must inspire your Men with confidence in one another and in you 474
CHAPTER XXXIV By what reports, rumours, or surmises the Citizens of a Republic are led to favour a Fellow-citizen; and whether the Magistracies are bestowed with better judgment by a People or by a Prince 477
CHAPTER XXXV Of the Danger incurred in being the first to recommend new measures; and that the more unusual the measures the greater the danger 482
CHAPTER XXXVI Why it has been and still may be affirmed of the Gauls, that at the beginning of a fray they are more than Men, but afterwards less than Women 485
CHAPTER XXXVII Whether a general engagement should be preceded by skirmishes; and how, avoiding these, we may get knowledge of a new Enemy 488
CHAPTER XXXVIII Of the Qualities of a Captain in whom his Soldiers can confide 492
CHAPTER XXXIX That a Captain should have good knowledge of Places 494
CHAPTER XL That Fraud is fair in war 497
CHAPTER XLI That our Country is to be defended by Honour or by Dishonour; and in either way is well defended 498
CHAPTER XLII That Promises made on compulsion are not to be observed 500
CHAPTER XLIII That Men born in the same Province retain through all times nearly the same Character 501
CHAPTER XLIV That where ordinary methods fail, Hardihood and Daring often succeed 504
CHAPTER XLV Whether in battle it is better to await and repel the enemy's attack, or to anticipate it by an impetuous onset 506
CHAPTER XLVI How the Characteristics of Families come to be perpetuated 507
CHAPTER XLVII That love of his Country should lead a good Citizen to forget private Wrongs 508
CHAPTER XLVIII That on finding an Enemy make what seems a grave blunder, we should suspect some fraud to lurk behind 509
CHAPTER XLIX That a Commonwealth to preserve its Freedom has constant need of new Ordinances. Of the services in respect of which Quintius Fabius received the surname of Maximus 511