Web and Internet Economics
Editat de Evangelos Markakis, Guido Schäferen Limba Engleză Paperback – 9 dec 2015
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Specificații
ISBN-13: 9783662489949
ISBN-10: 3662489945
Pagini: 464
Ilustrații: XIX, 442 p. 34 illus. in color.
Dimensiuni: 155 x 235 x 25 mm
Greutate: 0.7 kg
Ediția:1st edition 2015
Editura: Springer
Locul publicării:Berlin, Heidelberg, Germany
ISBN-10: 3662489945
Pagini: 464
Ilustrații: XIX, 442 p. 34 illus. in color.
Dimensiuni: 155 x 235 x 25 mm
Greutate: 0.7 kg
Ediția:1st edition 2015
Editura: Springer
Locul publicării:Berlin, Heidelberg, Germany
Public țintă
ResearchCuprins
Sequential Posted Price Mechanisms with Correlated Valuations.- PriceCompetition in Networked Markets: How Do Monopolies Impact Social Welfare.- ComputingStable Coalitions: Approximation Algorithms for Reward Sharing.- The(Non)-Existence of Stable Mechanisms in Incomplete Information Environments.- FastConvergence in the Double Oral Auction.- Minority Becomes Majority in SocialNetworks.- New Complexity Results and Algorithms for the Minimum Tollbooth Problem.-Ad Exchange: Envy-free Auctions with Mediators.- Computing Approximate NashEquilibria in Network Congestion Games with Polynomially Decreasing CostFunctions.- On Stackelberg Strategies in Affine Congestion Games.- ImpartialSelection and the Power of Up to Two Choices.- Online Allocation and Pricingwith Economies of Scale.- Multilateral Deferred-Acceptance Mechanisms.- TestingConsumer Rationality using Perfect Graphs and Oriented Discs.- Computation ofStackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games.- Welfare and RationalityGuarantees for the Simultaneous Multiple-Round Ascending Auction.- CombinatorialAuctions with Conflict-Based Externalities.- Applications of α-strongly RegularDistributions to Bayesian Auctions.- The Curse of Sequentiality in RoutingGames.- Adaptive Rumor Spreading.- Privacy and Truthful Equilibrium Selectionfor Aggregative Games.- Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive BundlingEquilibrium.- Often Harder Than in the Constructive Case: Destructive Briberyin CP-nets.- Improving Selfish Routing for Risk-Averse Players.- The VCG Mechanismfor Bayesian Scheduling.- Incentivizing Exploration with Heterogeneous Value ofMoney.- Bottleneck Routing with Elastic Demands.- Mechanisms with Monitoringfor Truthful RAM Allocation.- Inverse Game Theory: Learning Utilities inSuccinct Games.- Query Complexity of Approximate Equilibria in Anonymous Games.
Caracteristici
Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras