International relations theories often focus on the relationship between power and states' interests. The capabilities of a state reflect its level of power. When a state seeks to achieve a policy goal based on its security interests, the state considers the power relationship between itself and the other state, often in terms of military and economic capability. Power may take on different forms in the twenty-first century, and the motivation behind any action becomes meaningful at the individual or group level. This study seeks to enter into the mind of the policy maker, determine whether the rogue state image is held by policy makers, and their responses to rogues in a crisis situation. It is an attempt to determine why policy makers promote the policy preferences they do. How policy makers perceive the transition of a state from that of a dependent of the enemy to that of a rogue, and the best policy preferences given the situation, holds more importance than what an objective observer may view as the "true" situation and the "right" policy. What policy makers perceive is their truth, and their policies reflect this perception. By considering the similarities and differences in the perceptions and policy preferences of policy makers towards Iraq and North Korea over time, an understanding develops of how perceptions influence policy making, providing points of access for increasing successful policy outcomes. This study uncovers the perceived images of Iraq and North Korea during the Cold War, at the beginning of the 1990s, and once again near the end of the '90s, and the subsequent policy preferences held by policy makers for these two states. The dependent of the enemy image pervaded policy makers' perceptions of both Iraq and North Korea during the Cold War, the rogue state image emerged in the 1990s, while a difference in degree of image existed in the minds of some policy makers between Iraq and North Korea, all of which appeared to influence policy makers' policy preferences.