Throughout the history of the United States, the American military has integrated capabilities from diverse military units. From the regulars under Washington and the local militias in the American Revolution to the airborne Divisions of World War II to the Special Operations Forces in the Global War on Terror, all of these units developed an organizational culture all their own due to the background of their soldiers and the function of their units. These different organizations and cultures have led to friction whenever they are employed together. The same is true today for discussion of the integration of Special Operations Forces (SOF) and the General Purpose Force (GPF). This paper will examine the doctrine within the scope of two case studies: OPERATION ANACONDA and Operations in northern Iraq during OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003. In both cases, doctrine provided clear guidance in organizing command and control structures. With no gap in doctrine, the problems of integrating GPF and SOF capabilities arise from other areas such as organizational culture, personalities, or understanding.