"This book brings together two decades of scholarship on an important model of boundedly rational behavior in strategic decision-making settings. Including numerous important applications in economics, political science, and pure game theory, this unified treatment will be valuable to a wide range of scholars."--Timothy Cason, Purdue University
"Quantal response equilibrium is a standard tool for game theorists and has numerous connections to other tools and applications. This book collects and extends existing material on QRE and is a significant contribution to pure, and especially applied, game theory. No other books explicate QRE systematically beyond the introductory level and these authors are the right team for pulling the core material together."--Daniel Friedman, University of California, Santa Cruz
"Well-written and easy to follow, this book covers the topic of quantal response equilibrium. The notion of stochastic equilibrium has changed the way game theorists think about long-run and short-run equilibrium. Written by three leading experts, this book is of great importance to researchers in economic theory and political science, and to graduate students."--David K. Levine, European University Institute