Properties and Propositions
Autor Robert Truemanen Limba Engleză Hardback – 7 ian 2021
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Specificații
ISBN-13: 9781108840477
ISBN-10: 1108840477
Pagini: 240
Dimensiuni: 161 x 237 x 22 mm
Greutate: 0.47 kg
Editura: Cambridge University Press
Locul publicării:Cambridge, United Kingdom
ISBN-10: 1108840477
Pagini: 240
Dimensiuni: 161 x 237 x 22 mm
Greutate: 0.47 kg
Editura: Cambridge University Press
Locul publicării:Cambridge, United Kingdom
Cuprins
Introduction; 1. Substitution in a Sense; 2. The Term/Predicate Distinction; 3. Ramsey's Challenge; 4. Two Types of Reference; 5. The Reference Principle; 6. Fregean Realism; 7. Fregean Nominalism; 8. Some ; 9. The Concept Horse Paradox; 10. The Metaphysics Exam; 11. States of A airs; 12. The Prenective View of Propositional Content; 13. On Content and Object; 14. The Identity Theory of Truth; References; Index.
Recenzii
'This is an excellent book. Trueman offers a sophisticated argument for a Fregean conception of higher-order logic, and adeptly applies the resulting view to a number of philosophical questions. I recommend it highly it to anyone interested in issues to do with properties and propositions in philosophical logic, the philosophy of language, and metaphysics.' Michael Rieppel, Syracuse University
'In the last quarter of the twentieth-century, logicians escaped from the Quinean straitjacket which had tried to confine their subject to first-order logic. In the past ten years, a band of younger philosophers has been exploring the consequences of that liberation for metaphysics. One of its leaders, Robert Trueman, has now set out at length his view of those consequences for properties and propositions. The resulting book is consistently engaging and thought-provoking. Throughout its pages we hear an attractive new philosophical voice: forthright, clever, guileless.' Ian Rumfitt, All Souls College, University of Oxford
'This is just the sort of book I like. Trueman enters one of the most notorious of philosophical swamps - Frege's puzzle of the concept horse - and emerges triumphant at the other end, in an outstanding display of clarity, rigor, and philosophical sense. And that's just the beginning. Trueman goes on to generalize his resolution of the puzzle to a satisfying and wide-ranging philosophy of logic; all of this while remaining pleasingly attentive to historical sources and writing wonderful prose. Properties and Propositions is sure to be a standard reference for years to come.' Agustín Rayo, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
'In the last quarter of the twentieth-century, logicians escaped from the Quinean straitjacket which had tried to confine their subject to first-order logic. In the past ten years, a band of younger philosophers has been exploring the consequences of that liberation for metaphysics. One of its leaders, Robert Trueman, has now set out at length his view of those consequences for properties and propositions. The resulting book is consistently engaging and thought-provoking. Throughout its pages we hear an attractive new philosophical voice: forthright, clever, guileless.' Ian Rumfitt, All Souls College, University of Oxford
'This is just the sort of book I like. Trueman enters one of the most notorious of philosophical swamps - Frege's puzzle of the concept horse - and emerges triumphant at the other end, in an outstanding display of clarity, rigor, and philosophical sense. And that's just the beginning. Trueman goes on to generalize his resolution of the puzzle to a satisfying and wide-ranging philosophy of logic; all of this while remaining pleasingly attentive to historical sources and writing wonderful prose. Properties and Propositions is sure to be a standard reference for years to come.' Agustín Rayo, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Descriere
Articulates and defends a novel theory of properties and propositions, based on Frege's insight that properties are not objects.