"MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Escalation, 1962-1967," is the first of two volumes that examine the Vietnam conflict from the perspective of the theater commander and his headquarters. It traces the story of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), from its establishment in February 1962 to the climax of American escalation at the end of 1967. It deals with theater-level command relationships, strategy, and operations and supplements detailed studies in the Center of Military History's United States Army in Vietnam series covering combat operations, the advisory effort, and relations with the media. "MACV: The Joint Command" recounts how the MACV commander and his staff viewed the war at various periods and how and why they arrived at their decisions. It analyzes the interservice politics of organizing and managing a joint command; MACV's relationships with Pacific Command, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the secretary of defense; and the evolution of the command's dealings with its South Vietnamese and third country allies. Perhaps most important, it traces the commander's role in developing and executing U.S. policy in Vietnam, a role that extended beyond military operations to encompass diplomacy and pacification. As an experiment-not entirely successful-in nation building, the story of the Military Assistance Command contains many parallels to more recent Army engagements and so serves as a potential source of important lessons.