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Learning to Govern Together in Representative Democracy: The Dynamics of Cooperation and Competition in Coalition Governance de Thomas König

Learning to Govern Together in Representative Democracy: The Dynamics of Cooperation and Competition in Coalition Governance: Comparative Politics

Autor Thomas König, Xiao Lu, Thiago N. Silva
en Limba Engleză Hardback – 29 mai 2025

Notăm cu interes apariția volumului Learning to Govern Together in Representative Democracy, o lucrare ce propune o schimbare de paradigmă în analiza guvernanței de coaliție prin introducerea unei teorii dinamice bazate pe învățare și regresie circulară. Metodologia este riguros structurată pentru a aborda natura „pro tempore” a democrației reprezentative, unde timpul limitat al unui mandat forțează partidele să rezolve problemele de acțiune colectivă într-un ritm accelerat. Autorii organizează materialul în jurul ideii că stimulentele de cooperare și competiție nu sunt statice, ci evoluează pe măsură ce actorii politici „învață” tipul de parteneriat din interacțiunile legislative anterioare.

Putem afirma că forța acestui studiu rezidă în dimensiunea sa empirică impresionantă, analizând 25.000 de legi din 11 sisteme parlamentare. Această abordare oferă o perspectivă nuanțată asupra modului în care miniștrii decid momentul oportun pentru inițierea proiectelor legislative: mai devreme, dacă anticipează cooperare, sau mai târziu, dacă se așteaptă la un control parlamentar intens din partea partenerilor. Cititorii familiarizați cu Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining de Kaare Strøm vor aprecia modul în care volumul de față extinde teoria costurilor de tranzacție, adăugând variabila temporală și mecanismele de învățare activă care lipsesc din modelele tradiționale de negociere.

În contextul operei autorului Thomas König, lucrarea reprezintă o rafinare a interesului său pentru mecanismele legislative complexe, vizibilă anterior în The Europeanization of Domestic Legislatures. Dacă în lucrările precedente accentul cădea pe influența externă asupra legislativului, aici atenția se mută pe dinamica internă a coalițiilor, oferind un model teoretic solid pentru înțelegerea stabilității guvernamentale și a eficienței politicilor publice în democrațiile contemporane.

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Specificații

ISBN-13: 9780198959014
ISBN-10: 019895901X
Pagini: 160
Dimensiuni: 160 x 240 x 15 mm
Greutate: 0.33 kg
Editura: OUP OXFORD
Colecția OUP Oxford
Seria Comparative Politics

Locul publicării:Oxford, United Kingdom

De ce să citești această carte

Această lucrare este esențială pentru cercetătorii și studenții la științe politice care doresc să înțeleagă mecanismele reale din spatele eficienței guvernelor de coaliție. Cititorul câștigă un instrument metodologic nou — regresia circulară — și o înțelegere profundă a modului în care constrângerile de timp dictează succesul sau eșecul unei agende politice comune, trecând dincolo de simplele descrieri empirice spre un model predictiv al comportamentului partizan.

Despre autor

Thomas König este un reputat specialist în științe politice, ocupând funcția de profesor de Metode de Cercetare Politică la Universitatea din Mannheim. Expertiza sa acoperă procesele decizionale europene și dinamica legislativă comparată. Xiao Lu și Thiago N. Silva contribuie cu analize riguroase în domeniul comportamentului politic și al instituțiilor. Împreună, autorii au publicat extensiv despre integrarea europeană și influența structurilor politice asupra legislației naționale, această lucrare fiind rezultatul unei colaborări strânse în cadrul rețelei European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR).

Descriere

Learning to Govern Together in Representative Democracy introduces a dynamic theory on coalition governance and circular regression for studying joint policy-making of coalition parties, which considers the “pro tempore” nature of representative democracy. Because representative democracy limits the time to govern, the implementation of a common policy agenda is temporarily constrained. In parliamentary democracies, in which coalition governance is the rule, this temporal constraint demands that coalition parties overcome their collective action problems in joint policy-making within a term. This book argues that the cooperative and competitive incentives of coalition parties vary over time. In the beginning of a term, coalition parties only have a prior belief about the type of partnership, and ministerial office-holders, who are responsible for the implementation of a common policy agenda, do not know how many bills they will initiate and whether their partner will respond cooperatively or competitively to their bill proposals. Over time, however, they can learn this type from experienced interactions in joint policy-making to optimize the timing of further bill initiation. To derive propositions and hypotheses on timing of bill initiation, the authors distinguish two learning models, a portfolio-model with autonomous learning from experienced interactions within the own jurisdiction, and a partisan-model with considering experienced interactions of co-partisan office-holders. The empirical examination of these models for the timing of bill initiation covers 11 parliamentary democracies, in which about 25.000 government bills were initiated and immediately approved or scrutinized in parliament. The findings show that ministerial office-holders infer the type of partnership from the duration of parliamentary scrutiny and initiate further bill proposals either early, if they learned about a cooperative type that immediately approved their bills, or late, if they learned about a competitive type that subjected their bills to intense parliamentary scrutiny. The results further reveal variation across the periods of a term, in which the cooperative and competitive incentives of coalition parties vary due to the temporal constrains for representative democracy. The book provides an understanding of the dynamics of coalition effectiveness, stability of coalition government, and satisfaction with coalition governance, which are determined by learning about the cooperative or competitive partnership type, portfolio- or partisan learning, and the early or late timing of bill initiation. Comparative Politics is a series for researchers, teachers, and students of political science that deals with contemporary government and politics. Global in scope, books in the series are characterized by a stress on comparative analysis and strong methodological rigour. The series is published in association with the European Consortium for Political Research. For more information visit: www.ecprnet.eu .The series is edited by Nicole Bolleyer, Chair of Comparative Political Science, Geschwister Scholl Institut, LMU Munich and Jonathan Slapin, Professor of Political Institutions and European Politics, Department of Political Science, University of Zurich.This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations.

Notă biografică

Thomas König has been a Chairholder for European politics at the University Mannheim since 2007, after professorships at the German University, Washington University St. Louis, and the University of Konstanz. After studies at the universities of Heidelberg and Mannheim, he moved to the University of Kiel and started his international career with a Marie-Curie fellow as Assistant Professor at the University of Groningen, followed by a Heisenberg fellowship at Stanford University. In this period, he collaborated in several international projects, which were awarded by a nomination for the Descartes Prize and honoured by guest professorships.Xiao Lu is Assistant Professor at the School of International Studies at Peking University, and Director of Data and Methodology at Analytics Lab for Global Risk Politics, Peking University. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Mannheim University and his research focuses on developing both theoretical and statistical models for analyzing heterogeneous and dynamic political process, with a special focus on party competition, legislative decision making, and political representation and accountability of coalition governance in European countries. His work has been published in American Political Science Review, Political Analysis, European Journal of Political Research, Journal of Theoretical Politics, among others.Thiago N. Silva is a Lecturer at the School of Politics & International Relations and Deputy Director of the Australian Centre for Federalism at the Australian National University. Silva received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Texas A&M University, USA, and, from 2019-2022, was a Postdoctoral Researcher in Political Economy at the University of Mannheim, Germany. His research agenda focuses on comparative politics, with an emphasis on political institutions and political economy. In his recent projects, he examines the dynamics of coalition governance in both presidential and parliamentary democracies and their impact on party competition, voter behaviour, and opposition behaviour.