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Knowledge from Non-Knowledge: Inference, Testimony and Memory de Federico Luzzi

Knowledge from Non-Knowledge: Inference, Testimony and Memory

Autor Federico Luzzi
en Limba Engleză Paperback – 27 oct 2021
According to the received view in epistemology, inferential knowledge from non-knowledge is impossible - that is, in order for a subject to know the conclusion of their inference, they must know the essential premises from which that conclusion is drawn. In this book, Federico Luzzi critically examines this view, arguing that it is less plausible than intuition suggests and that it can be abandoned without substantial cost. In a discussion that ranges across inference, testimony and memory he analyses the full range of challenges to the view, connecting them to epistemological cases that support those challenges. He then proposes a defeater-based framework which allows the phenomenon of knowledge from non-knowledge across these three epistemic areas to be better understood. His book will be of interest to a wide range of readers in epistemology.
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Specificații

ISBN-13: 9781108741316
ISBN-10: 1108741312
Pagini: 210
Dimensiuni: 151 x 231 x 11 mm
Greutate: 0.29 kg
Editura: Cambridge University Press
Colecția Cambridge University Press
Locul publicării:Cambridge, United Kingdom

Cuprins

1. Knowledge from knowledge; 1.1 The default view; 1.2 Knowledge counter-closure; 1.3 A schema for KCC failures; 2. Inferential knowledge from falsehood; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Warfield on inferential knowledge from falsehood; 2.3 Warfield against the 'proxy-premise' strategy; 2.4 Montminy's defense of the proxy premise strategy and his attack on KFF; 2.5 Responding to Montminy's Challenge; 2.6. Against the proxy premise strategy; 2.7. Schnee on KFF; 2.8 Accounts of knowledge from falsehood; 2.9 Conclusion; 3. Inferential Knowledge from Unknown Truth: 3.1. Introduction; 3.2. KCC and Modal Conditions on Knowledge; 3.3. Agoraphobia; 3.4 The breadth of the challenge; 3.5 DeRose's attributor contextualism; 3.6 Birthday; 3.7 Stanley's interest-relative invariantism; 3.8 Coral; 3.9 Knowledge from essential falsehood?; 3.10 Conclusion; 4. How to abandon knowledge counter-closure; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Epistemic 'hocus-pocus'?; 4.3 Replacing KCC; 4.4 Murphy on justification and belief; 4.5 Denying KCC: costs?; 4.6 Multi-premise inference; 4.7 Conclusion; 5. Testimony and knowledge from non-knowledge: 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 Testimonial knowledge from non-knowledge; 5.3 Testimony and inference: a defeater asymmetry; 5.4 Second-hand knowledge; 5.5. Safety-based testimonial knowledge from non-knowledge; 5.6 Conclusion; 6. Memory and knowledge from non-knowledge; 6.1 Introduction; 6.2 Lackey's cases against KPS; 6.3 Señor's objections; 6.4 Factual-defeater-based case; 7. Knowledge from non-knowledge in inference, testimony and memory: 7.1 Inference, testimony and memory; 7.2 Conclusion.

Descriere

Challenges the idea that knowledge of a conclusion requires knowledge of essential premises, a widely accepted concept in epistemology.