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Games Real Actors Play: Actor-centered Institutionalism In Policy Research

Autor Fritz W. Scharpf
en Limba Engleză Hardback – 28 aug 2019
Games Real Actors Play provides a persuasive argument for the use of basic concepts of game theory in understanding public policy conflicts. Fritz Scharpf criticizes public choice theory as too narrow in its examination of actor motives and discursive democracy as too blind to the institutional incentives of political parties. With the nonspecialis
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Specificații

ISBN-13: 9780367315900
ISBN-10: 0367315904
Pagini: 336
Dimensiuni: 152 x 229 mm
Greutate: 0.57 kg
Ediția:1
Editura: Taylor & Francis
Colecția Routledge
Locul publicării:Oxford, United Kingdom

Cuprins

Introduction, 1 Policy Research in the Face of Complexity, 2 Actor-Centered Institutionalism, 3 Actors, 4 Actor Constellations, 5 Unilateral Action in Anarchic Fields and Minimal Institutions, 6 Negotiated Agreements, 7 Decisions by Majority Vote, 8 Hierarchical Direction, 9 Varieties of the Negotiating State

Notă biografică

Fritz W. Scharpf is codirector of the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne, Germany, and a former director of the International Institute of Management and Administration, Wissenschaftszentrum, Berlin. He has taught at the Yale Law School, the University of Chicago Law School, and at the University of Konstanz. He has published widely on constitutional law, democratic theory, policy formation and policy implementation, political economy, negotiation theory, and game theory.

Descriere

This book argues that substantive policy problems need to be mapped onto the constellations of policy actors involved and shows how these constellations can be represented by relatively simple game-theoretic models. It explicates the framework of actor-centered institutionalism.