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Fading Foundations: Probability and the Regress Problem de David Atkinson

Fading Foundations: Probability and the Regress Problem: Synthese Library, cartea 383

Autor David Atkinson, Jeanne Peijnenburg
en Limba Engleză Paperback – 12 mai 2018
This book is open access under a CC BY 4.0 license.
This book addresses the age-old problem of infinite regresses in epistemology. How can we ever come to know something if knowing requires having good reasons, and reasons can only be good if they are backed by good reasons in turn? The problem has puzzled philosophers ever since antiquity, giving rise to what is often called Agrippa's Trilemma. The current volume approaches the old problem in a provocative and thoroughly contemporary way. Taking seriously the idea that good reasons are typically probabilistic in character, it develops and defends a new solution that challenges venerable philosophical intuitions and explains why they were mistakenly held. Key to the new solution is the phenomenon of fading foundations, according to which distant reasons are less important than those that are nearby. The phenomenon takes the sting out of Agrippa's Trilemma; moreover, since the theory that describes it is general and abstract,it is readily applicable outside epistemology, notably to debates on infinite regresses in metaphysics. The book is a potential game-changer and a must for any advanced student or researcher in the field.
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Specificații

ISBN-13: 9783319863689
ISBN-10: 3319863681
Pagini: 238
Ilustrații: XI, 238 p.
Dimensiuni: 155 x 235 mm
Greutate: 0.36 kg
Ediția:Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 2017
Editura: Springer International Publishing
Colecția Springer
Seria Synthese Library

Locul publicării:Cham, Switzerland

Cuprins

1. The Regress Problem.- 2. Epistemic Justification.- 3. The Probabilistic Regress.- 4. Fading Foundations and the Emergence of Justification.- 5 Finite Minds.- 6. Conceptual Objections.- 7. Higher-Order Probabilities.- 8. Loops and Networks.

Textul de pe ultima copertă

This book is open access under a CC BY 4.0 license.
This book addresses the age-old problem of infinite regresses in epistemology. How can we ever come to know something if knowing requires having good reasons, and reasons can only be good if they are backed by good reasons in turn? The problem has puzzled philosophers ever since antiquity, giving rise to what is often called Agrippa's Trilemma. The current volume approaches the old problem in a provocative and thoroughly contemporary way. Taking seriously the idea that good reasons are typically probabilistic in character, it develops and defends a new solution that challenges venerable philosophical intuitions and explains why they were mistakenly held. Key to the new solution is the phenomenon of fading foundations, according to which distant reasons are less important than those that are nearby. The phenomenon takes the sting out of Agrippa's Trilemma; moreover, since the theory that describes it is general and abstract, it is readily applicable outside epistemology, notably to debates on infinite regresses in metaphysics. The book is a potential game-changer and a must for any advanced student or researcher in the field.

Caracteristici

This is an Open Access publication and the content is freely downloadable Sets out a potentially transformative, probabilistic approach to infinite regresses Cogent critical analysis of current limitations in infinitist methodology Core thematic focus on epistemology