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Blind Obedience: Paradox and Learning in the Later Wittgenstein

Autor Meredith Williams
en Limba Engleză Hardback – 17 dec 2009
There is considerable debate amongst philosophers as to the basic philosophical problem Wittgenstein is attempting to solve in Philosophical Investigations. In this bold and original work, Meredith Williams argues that it is the problem of "normative similarity".
In Blind Obedience Williams demonstrates how Wittgenstein criticizes traditional, representationalist theories of language by employing the ‘master/novice’ distinction of the learner, arguing that this distinction is often overlooked but fundamental to understanding philosophical problems about mind and language.
The book not only provides revealing discussions of Wittgenstein’s corpus but also intricate analyses of the work of Brandom, Dummett, Frege, Sellars, Davidson, Cavell and others. These are usefully compared in a bid to better situate Wittgenstein’s non-intellectualist, non-theoretical approach and to highlight is unique features.
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Specificații

ISBN-13: 9780415553001
ISBN-10: 0415553008
Pagini: 352
Dimensiuni: 156 x 234 x 20 mm
Greutate: 0.54 kg
Ediția:1
Editura: Taylor & Francis
Colecția Routledge
Locul publicării:Oxford, United Kingdom

Public țintă

Postgraduate and Undergraduate

Cuprins

1. Structure and Content of the Philosophical Investigations  2. Playing the Game  3. The Domestication of Reference  4. Logical Form and the Paradox of Thought  5. Meaning and the Paradox of Interpretation  6. Normativity and the Threat of Regularism  7. Necessity and the Threat of Psychologism  8.The Paradoxes of Consciousness  9. Concluding Remarks

Descriere

In Blind Obedience Williams demonstrates how Wittgenstein criticizes traditional, representationalist theories of language by employing the ‘master/novice’ distinction of the learner, arguing that this distinction is often overlooked but fundamental to understanding philosophical problems about mind and language.