When the war in Afghanistan ended in 2002, the country was largely governed by Afghans. This result came about because, rather than inserting thousands of troops into the country, the U.S. fought the war using a new type of military operation that relied on special forces, airpower, and Afghan allies. In the operation, around fifty U.S. special forces personnel accomplished what planners had believed would require 50,000 U.S. ground troops. In the wake of the war military planners largely dismissed the Afghan model as unworkable elsewhere. In this article, the authors examine how the new method performed in Afghanistan and later in Iraq. They explain why it worked and show that the traditional military's pessimism is unwarranted. They argue that the Afghan model vastly improves U.S. leverage in coercive diplomacy and war because it requires few U.S. ground troops and facilitates the transition to stability and democracy by empowering indigenous allies.