As the United States banking system enters the 1990s, the industry and its regulators face a crisis of major proportions. Successive problems have plagued various lending markets, bank failure rates have increased, and traditional regulatory techniques of risk control have proved unsuccessful. In this work, Helen A. Garten examines the current crisis in bank regulation and the regulatory response. In addition, she provides a series of recommendations for reforming the system so that regulatory failure will not occur again.

Garten begins her study with a strategic view of bank regulation as a response to financial crises in the banking business. Just as the bank failures of the 1930s led to a radical shift in bank regulatory technique, recent competitive pressures and technological innovations that have lessened the profitability of the deposit-lending business are leading to a shift in regulatory strategy today. Although some deregulation has taken place, Garten contends that more significant changes are occurring in the regulation that remains. Regulators are experimenting with a new approach to risk control that will create economic incentives for banks to adopt more successful investment strategies. Garten compares these new regulatory initiatives to the disciplinary techniques of the typical corporate equityholder and shows how they differ from the debtholder's techniques of traditional post-Depression bank regulation. She concludes that the new regulatory strategy may not be enough to help the banking industry emerge from its current difficulties. This work will be an essential resource for lawyers and bankers involved with regulatory policy, as well as for economists and scholars of finance and administrative law.