Social Choice, Welfare, and Ethics
Editat de William A. Barnett, Herve Moulin, Norman J. Schofielden Limba Engleză Hardback – 3 aug 2010
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Specificații
ISBN-13: 9780521443401
ISBN-10: 0521443407
Pagini: 432
Ilustrații: 28 b/w illus. 27 tables
Dimensiuni: 157 x 235 x 30 mm
Greutate: 0.85 kg
Ediția:New.
Editura: Cambridge University Press
Locul publicării:New York, United States
ISBN-10: 0521443407
Pagini: 432
Ilustrații: 28 b/w illus. 27 tables
Dimensiuni: 157 x 235 x 30 mm
Greutate: 0.85 kg
Ediția:New.
Editura: Cambridge University Press
Locul publicării:New York, United States
Cuprins
Introduction and overview Hervé Moulin, Maurice Salles and Norman J. Schofield; Part I. Historical Aspects of Social Choice: 1. The first golden age of social choice, 1784–1803 Ian McLean; Part II. Ethical Aspects of Social Choice: 2. The requisites of equal opportunity Marc Fleurbaey; 3. Social choice of individual and group rights Peter J. Hammond; 4. Population monotonic allocation rules William Thomson; Part III. Algebraic and Combinatorial Aspects of Social Choice: 5. Condorcet efficiency and social homogeneity William Gehrlein; 6. Latticial theory of consensus Bernard Leclerc and Bernard Monjardet; Part IV. Geometric Aspects of Social Choice: 7. Arrow theorems in economic environments James Redekop; 8. Inner consistency or not inner consistency: a reformulation in the answer Donald G. Saari; 9. Existence of a smooth social function Norman J. Schofield; 10. Dynamical convergence in the Euclidean spatial model Craig A. Tovey; Part IV. Social Choice and Co-operative Games: 11. Incentives in market games with asymmetric information Beth Allen; 12. A note on implementation and strong dominance Tilman Börgers; 13. Coalition-proof communication equilibria Ezra Einy and Bezalel Peleg; 14. Stability of coalition structures and the principle of optimal partitioning Michel Le Breton and Shlomo Weber; 15. The hold-out game: an experimental study of an infinitely repeated game with two-sided complete information Richard D. McKelvey and Thomas R. Palfrey; Part IV. Other Applications: 16. Exact Aggregation under Risk William A. Barnett; 17. The stochastic dominance ordering of income distributions over time: the discounted sum of the expected utilities of incomes Thierry Karcher, Patrick Moyes and Alain Trannoy; Appendix.
Descriere
This book presents an overview of developments in social choice theory and welfare economics.