Reasoning with Attitude: Foundations and Applications of Inferential Expressivism
Autor Luca Incurvati, Julian J. Schlöderen Limba Engleză Hardback – feb 2024
Preț: 566.50 lei
Preț vechi: 836.95 lei
-32%
Puncte Express: 850
Carte disponibilă
Livrare economică 25 septembrie-06 octombrie
Livrare prin curier în România Termenul estimat este afișat lângă disponibilitate.
Transport gratuit pentru acest produs Plată online sau ramburs, în funcție de opțiunile comenzii.
Retur gratuit în 14 zile Comandă securizată și suport în română.
Specificații
ISBN-13: 9780197620984
ISBN-10: 0197620981
Pagini: 352
Dimensiuni: 226 x 168 x 41 mm
Greutate: 0.64 kg
Editura: Oxford University Press
Colecția OUP USA
Locul publicării:New York, United States
ISBN-10: 0197620981
Pagini: 352
Dimensiuni: 226 x 168 x 41 mm
Greutate: 0.64 kg
Editura: Oxford University Press
Colecția OUP USA
Locul publicării:New York, United States
Notă biografică
Luca Incurvati is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy and in the Institute for Logic, Language and Computation at the University of Amsterdam. A recipient of an ERC Starting Grant, he has published numerous journal articles in these areas and is the author of Conceptions of Set and the Foundations of Mathematics (Cambridge University Press, 2020).Julian J. Schlöder is an Assistant Research Professor of Philosophy at the Philosophy Department of the University of Connecticut.
Cuprins
- List of Figures
- Preface
- 1 Expressivism
- 1.1 Semantics, postsemantics and meta-semantics
- 1.2 Why expressivism?
- 1.3 Speaker subjectivism
- 1.4 Traditional expressivism
- 1.5 Attitude expression
- 1.6 The Frege--Geach Problem
- 1.7 Sophisticated expressivism
- 1.8 The Many Attitudes Problem
- 1.9 The Wishful Thinking Problem
- 1.10 The Problem of Creeping Minimalism
- 2 Inferentialism
- 2.1 Inferentialist semantics
- 2.2 From semantics to meta-semantics and back
- 2.3 Why inferentialism?
- 2.4 The Problem of Defective Concepts
- 2.5 The Problem of Constitutive Rules
- 2.6 The Problem of Limited Applicability
- 3 Inferential Expressivism
- 3.1 Traditional expressivism about negation
- 3.2 Bilateralism and Frege--Geach
- 3.3 Inferential expressivism
- 3.4 Mixed inferences and Frege--Geach
- 3.5 Evidence and the problem of weak rejections
- 3.6 From bilateralism to multilateralism
- 3.7 Linguistic realization of strong rejection
- 3.8 Appendix
- 4 Epistemic Modals
- 4.1 Traditional expressivism about might
- 4.2 Might and perhaps
- 4.3 Weak assertion
- 4.4 Coordinating the speech acts
- 4.5 The meaning of might
- 4.6 Weak assertions, epistemic modal assertions, and evidence
- 4.7 Frege--Geach and its revenge version
- 4.8 Modal disagreement and Yalcinean sentences
- 4.9 Appendix
- 5 Moral Vocabulary
- 5.1 The Negation Problem
- 5.2 Bilateralism and the Negation Problem
- 5.3 Disapproval and moral vocabulary
- 5.4 Schroeder and the Negation Problem
- 5.5 Wishful thinking and evidence
- 5.6 Moral Moorean sentences
- 5.7 Moral motivation
- 6 Attitudes
- 6.1 Many attitudes, few contents
- 6.2 Expressing many attitudes
- 6.3 Ascribing many attitudes
- 6.4 Having many attitudes
- 6.5 Semantics in its proper place
- 7 Truth
- 7.1 Traditional expressivism about truth
- 7.2 The meaning of the truth predicate
- 7.3 Evidence and the truth rules
- 7.4 The truth predicate in multilateral logic
- 7.5 Truth and supervaluation
- 7.6 Classical recapture and revenge
- 7.7 Rejectability and revenge
- 7.8 Epistemic Liars
- 7.9 The question of realism
- 7.10 Appendix
- 8 Conditionals
- 8.1 Binary speech acts
- 8.2 Frege--Geach for conditionals
- 8.3 Counterfactuals and counterepistemics
- 8.4 The Gibbard Collapse Argument
- 8.5 Generalised Yalcinean sentences
- 8.6 Curry's Paradox
- 8.7 Content conditionals and inferential conditionals
- 8.8 On the plurality of conditionals
- 9 Probability
- 9.1 Traditional expressivism about probable
- 9.2 Probable and probably
- 9.3 Moderate assertion and moderate rejection
- 9.4 Coordination principles
- 9.5 Operational rules
- 9.6 Evidence and probability
- 9.7 Inferential expressivism about probability
- 9.8 Gradability
- 9.9 Moss on probabilistic belief
- 10 The Road Ahead
- Bibliography
- Index