What attitude should we take to our philosophical theories? Much of the impetus for contemporary answers to the "attitude question" comes from the revival of philosophical interest in the epistemology of disagreement: Can we justifiably believe our views about philosophical questions when our equally intelligent colleagues disagree with us (and each other)? Philosophy with Attitude features sixteen contributions offering a variety of answers to the attitude question. Some argue that we are epistemically justified in believing our preferred philosophical views despite systematic disagreement. Others maintain that there are reasons to believe our philosophical views, but side with William James in thinking these reasons are pragmatic, not epistemic. Many of the volume's contributors reject belief as an answer to the attitude question offering more sceptical responses. One such possibility draws on the thinking of the Ancient Sceptics to suggest that suspension of judgement about our philosophical theories is the appropriate attitude to take. More sceptical views say that suspension is not enough: we ought to disbelieve our preferred philosophical theories. Several contributions propose quasi-belief attitudes including inclination, endorsement, transitional beliefs, and championing.