This book examines the nature of inquiry--the general method by which we expand our knowledge. It proposes a resolution of the paradox of inquiry, originally formulated in Plato's Meno and most recently the focus of the "logic of discovery" debate in the philosophy of science. The logic of correction developed here directly opposes the claim made by evolutionary epistemologists such as Popper and Campbell that there is no such thing as a "logical method for having new ideas." The author argues that beyond scientific discovery, the same logic can be found in the more intimate form of inquiry we conduct as we attempt to articulate meanings for ourselves. This comprehensive and revolutionary theory challenges traditional epistemology's conception of justification and provides substantial new interpretations of the nature of ampliative inference, representation and meaning, Platonic and Hegelian dialectic, Kantian analysis, the heuristic function of models and metaphors, and the role of inquiry in the constitution of human consciousness.