Nuclear Strategizing
Autor Stephen J. Cimbalaen Limba Engleză Hardback – 3 aug 1988
Cimbala critically examines the rational behind Western defense policies based on deterrence. According to the author, nuclear strategizing--or coping with outside threats--is shortsighted--dependent as it is on economic analogies and technical fixation. It leaves unanswered important questions about the relationships between strategy, politics, and long-term defense goals. Cimbala examines a number of issues from this point of departure, including: arms control, de-escalation and escalation, control of nuclear forecast, and the future of conventional forces.
Preț: 491.84 lei
Preț vechi: 805.13 lei
-39%
Puncte Express: 738
Carte tipărită la comandă
Livrare economică 01-15 ianuarie 27
Livrare prin curier în România Termenul estimat este afișat lângă disponibilitate.
Transport gratuit pentru acest produs Plată online sau ramburs, în funcție de opțiunile comenzii.
Retur gratuit în 14 zile Comandă securizată și suport în română.
Specificații
ISBN-13: 9780275929879
ISBN-10: 0275929876
Pagini: 320
Dimensiuni: 161 x 240 x 22 mm
Greutate: 0.6 kg
Editura: Praeger
ISBN-10: 0275929876
Pagini: 320
Dimensiuni: 161 x 240 x 22 mm
Greutate: 0.6 kg
Editura: Praeger
Descriere
This is an excellent advanced study in strategy in the nuclear age. Cimbala covers the field thoroughly. He challenges much of the conventional and established approaches to deterrence and crisis management. . . . Cimbala's work is a valuable and refreshing addition to the literature. Scholars will find it enriching and challenging. . . . This is a must acquisition for university and professional libraries. Choice
Cimbala critically examines the rational behind Western defense policies based on deterrence. According to the author, nuclear strategizing--or coping with outside threats--is shortsighted--dependent as it is on economic analogies and technical fixation. It leaves unanswered important questions about the relationships between strategy, politics, and long-term defense goals. Cimbala examines a number of issues from this point of departure, including: arms control, de-escalation and escalation, control of nuclear forecast, and the future of conventional forces.
Cimbala critically examines the rational behind Western defense policies based on deterrence. According to the author, nuclear strategizing--or coping with outside threats--is shortsighted--dependent as it is on economic analogies and technical fixation. It leaves unanswered important questions about the relationships between strategy, politics, and long-term defense goals. Cimbala examines a number of issues from this point of departure, including: arms control, de-escalation and escalation, control of nuclear forecast, and the future of conventional forces.
Notă biografică
STEPHEN J. CIMBALA is Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University.