No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in the Vietnam WarDe (autor) Gregory A. Daddis
en Limba Engleză Hardback – 09 Jun 2011
deeper into the Army's techniques for measuring military success and presents a much more complicated-and disturbing-account of the American misadventure in Indochina. Daddis shows how the US Army, which confronted an unfamiliar enemy and an even more unfamiliar form of warfare, adopted a massive, and eventually unmanageable, system of measurements and formulas to track the progress of military operations that ranged from pacification efforts to search-and-destroy
missions. The Army's monthly Measurement of Progress reports covered innumerable aspects of the fighting in Vietnam-force ratios, Vietcong/North Vietnamese Army incidents, tactical air sorties, weapons losses, security of base areas and roads, population control, area control, and hamlet defenses.
Concentrating more on data collection and less on data analysis, these indiscriminate attempts to gauge success may actually have hindered the army's ability to evaluate the true outcome of the fight at hand--a roadblock that Daddis believes significantly contributed to the many failures that
American forces suffered in Vietnam. Filled with incisive analysis and rich historical detail, No Sure Victory is not only a valuable case study in unconventional warfare, but a cautionary tale that offers important perspectives on how to measure performance in current and future armed conflict. Given America's ongoing
counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, No Sure Victory provides valuable historical perspective on how to measure--and mismeasure--military success.
This timely and important book is a major addition to the military history of the Vietnam War. It should be required reading for those grappling with the issues posed by counterinsurgency wars today.
Gregory A. Daddis is Academy Professor of History at the United States Military Academy, West Point, and a Colonel in the U.S. Army.