Narrative Identity and Personal Responsibility
Autor Linda Ethellen Limba Engleză Hardback – 28 iun 2010
Innovative in its interdisciplinary juxtaposition of ethics, moral psychology, literary theory and literature, Narrative Identity and Personal Responsibility develops a sophisticated and comprehensive account of human nature. This book offers an intuitively satisfying and humane yet rigorous account of why and how we think of ourselves as simultaneously free and constrained by nature. Its fundamental thesis, the mediation of narrative representation between agent and the world, suggests new answers to old problems in moral psychology, such as the question of free will and responsibility.
With a more literary style than many philosophy texts, it works through a series of interconnected problems of as much interest to a thoughtful layperson as to academic philosophers.
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Specificații
ISBN-13: 9780739125939
ISBN-10: 0739125931
Pagini: 264
Dimensiuni: 160 x 232 x 24 mm
Greutate: 0.61 kg
Editura: Bloomsbury Publishing
Colecția Lexington Books
Locul publicării:New York, United States
ISBN-10: 0739125931
Pagini: 264
Dimensiuni: 160 x 232 x 24 mm
Greutate: 0.61 kg
Editura: Bloomsbury Publishing
Colecția Lexington Books
Locul publicării:New York, United States
Cuprins
Chapter 1 Introduction
Part 2 Part One. Frankfurt, Taylor, and Self-Evaluation
Chapter 3 Chapter One. Frankfurt and Second-Order Evaluation
Chapter 4 Chapter Two. The Rational Wanton
Chapter 5 Chapter Three. Charles Taylor and the Nature of Desire
Part 6 Part Two. Desire and the Formation of Personal Identity
Chapter 7 Chapter Four. Desire and Personal Identity
Chapter 8 Chapter Five. The Value of Fantasy
Chapter 9 Chapter Six. Self-Knowledge and Narrative
Chapter 10 Chapter Seven. Responsibility for Self
Part 11 Part Three. A Defense of Empathy
Chapter 12 Chapter Eight. Plato on Mimesis
Chapter 13 Chapter Nine. Vicarious Emotion and Pleasure
Chapter 14 Chapter Ten. Aristotle on Mimesis: Aesthetic Pleasure
Part 15 Part Four. Narrative Identity
Chapter 16 Chapter Eleven. Ways of Being
Chapter 17 Chapter Twelve. Description, Interpretation, and Evaluation
Chapter 18 Chapter Thirteen. Exemption from Responsibility
Part 19 Part Five. Freedom and Resentment
Chapter 20 Chapter Fourteen. P.F. Strawson
Chapter 21 Chapter Fifteen. "Responsibility and the Limits of Evil"
Chapter 22 Chapter Sixteen. The Limits of the Moral Community
Chapter 23 Chapter Seventeen. Richard Wollheim: Retribution and Reparation
Chapter 24 Chapter Eighteen: Melanie Klein: Tragedy and Morality
Part 2 Part One. Frankfurt, Taylor, and Self-Evaluation
Chapter 3 Chapter One. Frankfurt and Second-Order Evaluation
Chapter 4 Chapter Two. The Rational Wanton
Chapter 5 Chapter Three. Charles Taylor and the Nature of Desire
Part 6 Part Two. Desire and the Formation of Personal Identity
Chapter 7 Chapter Four. Desire and Personal Identity
Chapter 8 Chapter Five. The Value of Fantasy
Chapter 9 Chapter Six. Self-Knowledge and Narrative
Chapter 10 Chapter Seven. Responsibility for Self
Part 11 Part Three. A Defense of Empathy
Chapter 12 Chapter Eight. Plato on Mimesis
Chapter 13 Chapter Nine. Vicarious Emotion and Pleasure
Chapter 14 Chapter Ten. Aristotle on Mimesis: Aesthetic Pleasure
Part 15 Part Four. Narrative Identity
Chapter 16 Chapter Eleven. Ways of Being
Chapter 17 Chapter Twelve. Description, Interpretation, and Evaluation
Chapter 18 Chapter Thirteen. Exemption from Responsibility
Part 19 Part Five. Freedom and Resentment
Chapter 20 Chapter Fourteen. P.F. Strawson
Chapter 21 Chapter Fifteen. "Responsibility and the Limits of Evil"
Chapter 22 Chapter Sixteen. The Limits of the Moral Community
Chapter 23 Chapter Seventeen. Richard Wollheim: Retribution and Reparation
Chapter 24 Chapter Eighteen: Melanie Klein: Tragedy and Morality
Recenzii
The book is original in the contemporary philosophical landscape in that it is a critique of the concepts of the 'moral praise' and 'moral blame', concepts that dominate the analytical debate on moral responsibility. . . The main point of Ethell's book is particularly interesting in the current philosophical climate, because it introduces the idea of the otherness or difference of human beings into the debate on moral responsibility. Ethell convincingly demonstrates that because people possess personal identities moral praise and blame must be understood as equivocal.