This books proposes a mathematical paradigm for modeling the rise and fall of coalitions during intrastate conflicts. It proposes that misalignment of preferences within constituencies drives instability, which can lead to revolution. To arrive at preference for an issue, the model considers two components: ideology and fervor. It shows that ideology tends to remain static while fervor changes rapidly. With the preferences of a society mapped according to constituents' ideology and fervor, the model then considers how coalitions exercise control in their quests for dominance. The model builds upon the foundation of expert thought on intrastate conflict. It uses their generally qualitative assessments and employs measurable data and linear algebra to give a more formal depiction of the dynamics at play. Mapping populations in this manner may give insight into optimal strategies for eliciting stability or instability in a state. Using a hypothetical country in a developing revolution, the work implements the map to depict a government's attempts to stabilize a devolving intrastate system. It shows how rival coalitions can rapidly rise from irrelevance to preeminence by manipulating fervor. The work concludes by depicting the impacts of various third-party strategies for intervening in intrastate conflicts.