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Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction

Autor Philip P. Frickey, Daniel A. Farber
en Limba Engleză Paperback – 15 ian 1991
In Law and Public Choice, Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey present a remarkably rich
and accessible introduction to the driving principles of public choice. In this, the first
systematic look at the implications of social choice for legal doctrine, Farber and Frickey
carefully review both the empirical and theoretical literature about interest group influence and provide a nonmathematical introduction to formal models of legislative action. Ideal for course use, this volume offers a balanced and perceptive analysis and critique of an approach which, within limits, can illuminate the dynamics of government decision-making.

Law and Public Choice is a most valuable contribution to the burgeoning literature. It
should be of great interest to lawyers, political scientists, and all others interested in issues at the intersection of government and law.”—Cass R. Sunstein, University of Chicago Law
School
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Specificații

ISBN-13: 9780226238036
ISBN-10: 0226238032
Pagini: 169
Dimensiuni: 152 x 229 x 13 mm
Greutate: 0.29 kg
Ediția:1
Editura: University of Chicago Press
Colecția University of Chicago Press

Notă biografică

Daniel A. Farber is the Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota. Philip P. Frickey is professor of law at the University of Minnesota.

Cuprins

Acknowledgments
Introduction
1. Interest Groups and the Political Process
I. The Impact of Interest Group Theory
II. Interest Groups and Political Science
III. The Economic Theory of Legislation
IV. Normative Implications
2. Arrow's Theorem and the Democratic Process
I. Arrow's Theorem and Its Implications
II. Republicanism
III. Chaos and Coherence in Legislatures
IV. Public Choice and Legislative Deliberation
3. Economic Regulation and the Constitution
I. Economic Rights and the Constitution
II. Federalism
III. The Delegation Doctrine
4. Statutory Interpretation
I. Legislative Intent
II. Legislative History
III. Ambiguous Language and Rational Choice
IV. Statutory Evolution
5. Integrating Public Choice and Public Law
I. Existing Strands of "Due Process of Lawmaking"
II. Expanding the Influence of Public Choice in Public Law
Epilogue: Beyond the Economic Sphere
Index