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James M. Buchanan de Richard E. Wagner

James M. Buchanan

Editat de Richard E. Wagner
en Limba Engleză Paperback – 15 aug 2020

Suntem de părere că această lucrare monumentală se distinge de orice alt studiu dedicat laureatului Nobel prin amploarea sa enciclopedică, însumând peste 1100 de pagini de analiză critică și extensie teoretică. Notăm cu interes că, spre deosebire de Exploring the Political Economy and Social Philosophy of James M. Buchanan de Paul Dragos Aligica — care se concentrează pe relevanța contemporană a filozofiei sociale — volumul editat de Richard E. Wagner oferă o reconstrucție metodologică mult mai densă și tehnică, fiind mai puțin abstract și considerabil mai aplicabil în înțelegerea mecanismelor fiscale ale statului. Credem că forța acestui volum rezidă în capacitatea de a explica de ce un economist care a respins formalizarea matematică și econometria a reușit să revoluționeze domeniul prin simpla rigoare a logicii și a limbajului.

Structura cărții este una progresivă, pornind de la fundamentele subiectivismului și metodologia economiei politice, pentru a ajunge la aplicații complexe în finanțele publice și teoria statului. Cititorul va parcurge un traseu intelectual ce examinează conflictul dintre constrângerile constituționale și puterea statului de a furniza bunuri publice. În contextul operei editorului, acest volum continuă direcția începută în Macroeconomics as Systems Theory, unde Richard E. Wagner refuza agregarea simplistă, propunând aici o viziune sistemică asupra ordinii democratice, similară cu temele din Reason, Ideology, and Democracy. Este o resursă care poziționează gândirea lui Buchanan nu doar ca istorie economică, ci ca un instrument activ de analiză a instituțiilor politice și a eticii sociale.

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Specificații

ISBN-13: 9783030404413
ISBN-10: 3030404412
Pagini: 1182
Ilustrații: XXI, 1182 p. 34 illus., 7 illus. in color.
Dimensiuni: 148 x 210 mm
Greutate: 1.63 kg
Ediția:2018 edition
Editura: Springer Nature Switzerland AG
Locul publicării:Cham, Switzerland

De ce să citești această carte

Recomandăm această carte cercetătorilor și studenților avansați în economie politică și științe sociale care doresc să înțeleagă mecanismele din spatele „alegerii publice”. Cititorul va câștiga o perspectivă profundă asupra modului în care regulile constituționale modelează rezultatele economice. Este un instrument esențial pentru oricine vrea să depășească modelele matematice rigide și să exploreze economia ca pe o ramură a filozofiei morale și politice.

Despre autor

Richard E. Wagner este un profesor distins de economie, activând în cadrul Center for Study of Public Choice la Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech). Specialist de renume în teoria sistemelor complexe aplicată în macroeconomie și în studiul ordinii constituționale, Wagner a fost un colaborator apropiat și un interpret de seamă al operei lui Buchanan. Lucrările sale se concentrează pe intersecția dintre finanțele publice, alegerea publică și filozofia politică, promovând o abordare realistă a modului în care funcționează democrațiile contemporane.

Cuprins

1. Who Was James M. Buchanan and Why is He Significant?- Richard E. Wagner

Part I:  Subjectivism and the Methodology of Political Economy
 
2. East Anglia, What Should Economists Do Now?- Robert Sugden

3. Duke, Starting from Where We Are: The Importance of the Status Quo in James Buchanan- Michael Munger

4. Brown, James Buchanan and the Properly Trained Economist- Peter J. Boettke, George Mason and Rosolino Candela

5. James Buchanan and the “New Economics of Order” Research Program- Stefan Kolev

6. George Mason, Emergence, Equilibrium, and Agent-based Modeling: Updating James Buchanan’s Democratic Political Economy- Abigail N. Devereaux, George Mason and Richard E. Wagner

Part II: Public Finance and the Theory of the State

7. The Conflict between Constitutionally Constraining the State and Empowering the State to Provide Public Goods- Lawrence H. White

8. Fiscal Constitutions, Institutional Congruence, and the Organization of Governments- Charles Beat Blankart and David Ehmke

9. The Irrelevance of Balanced Budget Amendments- David Hebert

10. Subsidizing Health Insurance: Tax Illusion and Public Choice for a mostly Private Good- Mark V. Pauly 

11. Inconsistencies in the Finance of Public Services: Government Responses to Excess Demand- Andrew Abbott and Philip Jones

12. The Unproductive Protective State: The U.S. Defense Sector as a Fiscal Commons- Christopher J. Coyne and Thomas K. Duncan

13. Contraception without Romance: The Entangled Political Economy of State and Federal Contraception Mandates- Marta Podemska-Mikluch and Gustavus Adolphus

14. Samaritan’s Dilemmas, Wealth Redistribution, and Polycentricity- Meg Tuszynski and Richard E. Wagner


Part III: Collective Action and Constitutional Political Economy

15. Constitutional Reform: Promise and Reality- Dennis Mueller

16. Constitutional, Political, and Behavioral Feasibility- Alan Hamlin

17.  Blockchain and Buchanan: Code as Constitution- Shruti Rajagopalan

18. Blockchains as Constitutional Orders- Chris Berg, Sinclair Davidson and Jason Potts

19. The Questionable Morality of Compromising the Influence of Public Choice by Embracing a “Nobel” Lie- J.R. Clark and Dwight R. Lee.

20. Beneficent Bullshit- Peter T. Leeson

21. Groups, Sorting, and Inequality in Constitutional Political Economy- Jayme Lemke

22. Votes, Vetoes, Voice, and Exit: Constitutional Protections in the work of James M. Buchanan and Vincent Ostrom- Roberta Herzberg

23.  On the Definition and Nature of Fiscal Coercion- George Tridimas

24.  Politics as Exchange in the Byzantine Empire- Adam Martin and James Ruhland

Part IV: Ethics, Social Philosophy, and Liberal Political Economy

25. James M. Buchanan: Political; Economist, Consistent Individualist- Viktor Vanberg 

26. A Public Choice Analysis of James M. Buchanan’s Constitutional Project- Randall Holcombe

27. Buchanan’s Social Contract Unveiled- Enrico Colombatto

28. Constitutional Design and Politics-as-Exchange: The Optimism of Public Choice- Georg Vanberg

29. Doing Liberal Political Economy: James M. Buchanan as Exemplar- Glenn L. Furton and Alexander W. Salter

30. Buchanan, Hayek, and the Limits of Constitutional Ambitions- Donald Boudreaux

31. James Buchanan and the Return to an Economics of Natural Equals- David M. Levy and Sandra J. Peart

32. From Highways to Clubs: On Buchanan and the Pricing of Public Goods- Alain Marciano

Part V: Economic Theory as Social Theory

33. In Defence of (Some) Vainglory: The Advantages of Polymorphic Hobbesianism- Jerry Gaus

34. Toward a Rule-based Model of Human Choice: On the Nature of Homo Constitutionalus- Roger Congleton

35. The Constitution of Markets- Geoffrey Brennan and Hartmut Kliemt

36. The Extent of the Market and Ethics- Yong Yoon

37. Why Roving Bandits Settle Down: Club Theory and the Emergence of Government- Andrew T. Young 

38. Rules vs. Discretion in Criminal Sentencing- Daniel D’Amico

39. Diagnosing the Electorate: James Buchanan in the Role of Political Economist- Solomon Stein

40. From Models to Experiments: James Buchanan and Charles Plott- Gil Hersch and Daniel Houser

Part VI: Money, Debt, and the Rule of Law

41. Rules Versus Authorities:  Buchanan and Simons and Fiscal Policy- Marianne Johnson

42. The Quest for Fiscal Rules- Lars Feld

43. The Irresistible Attraction of Public Debt- Vito Tanzi

44. Can there be such a thing as Legitimate Public Debt in a Democracy? De Viti de Marco and Buchanan Compared- Giuseppe Eusepi

45. Consequences of the Anachronism of Fractional Reserve Arrangements- Leonidas Zelmanovitz

Part VII: Buchanan in Relation to Other Prominent Scholars

46. Italian Influences on Buchanan’s Research Program- Alain Marciano and Manuela Mosca

47. Paretian Fiscal Sociology- Michael McLure

48. Artefactual and Artisanship: James M. Buchanan and Vincent Ostrom at the Core and beyond the Boundaries of Public Choice- Paul Dragos Aligica

49. The Calculus of Consent and the Compound Republic- Robert Bish

50. Why James Buchanan Kept Frank Knight’s Picture on the Wall despite Fundamental Disagreements on Economics, Ethics, and Politics- Ross Emmett

Recenzii

“This volume is so broad in scope, so rich in fascinating reflections, so instructive that anybody should benefit from it who has a genuine, if critical, interest in the work of James M. Buchanan. On this basis, it should be a pleasure to enter an informed, open discussion.” (Karen Horn, Constitutional Political Economy, Vol. 31, 2020)

Notă biografică

Richard E. Wagner is Holbert L. Harris Professor of Economics at George Mason University, USA. He is Senior Fellow of the Academic Advisory Board at the Independent Institute, the James Madison Institute for Public Policy Studies and the Virginia Institute for Public Policy. He was co-editor of the scholarly journal Constitutional Political Economy from 1989-1997, and he is currently a member of the editorial boards of Constitutional Political Economy, the Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice, and the Review of Austrian Economics. He was one of Buchanan’s dissertation students, a co-author with Buchanan, and a faculty colleague for some 25 years.




Textul de pe ultima copertă

“A fine collection of essays exploring, and in many cases extending, Jim Buchanan’s many contributions and insights to economic, political, and social theory.”
–Bruce Caldwell, Professor of Economics, Duke University, USA
"The overwhelming impression the reader gets from this very fine collection is the extraordinary expanse of James Buchanan's work. Everyone interested in economics and related fields can profit mightily from this book."
–Mario Rizzo, Professor of Economics, New York University, USA

This book explores the academic contribution of James Buchanan, who received the Nobel Prize for economics in 1986. Buchanan’s receipt of the Prize is noteworthy because he was a maverick within the economics profession. In contrast to the preponderance of economists, Buchanan made little use of mathematics and no use of econometrics, preferring to used logic and language to insert his ideas into the scholarly community. Moreover, his ideas extended the domain of economic inquiry along many paths that numerous economists subsequently pursued. Buchanan’s scholarship brought economics and political science together under the rubric of public choice. He was also was a prime figure in bringing economic theory into closer contact with moral and social philosophy.
This volume includes essays distributed across the extensive domain of Buchanan’s scholarly contributions, reflecting the range of his scholarly interests. Chapters will examine Buchanan’s scholarly work on public finance, social insurance, public debt, public choice, economic methodology, constitutional political economy, law and economics, and ethics and social theory. The book also examines Buchanan in relation to other prominent economists, both from the distant past and the recent past.

Caracteristici

Explores a radical thinker in the field of economics whose work has not been brought together in a single volume before now
Edited by the leading scholar of James Buchanan
Minimises the use of mathematics and overly technical jargon to ensure an accessible read across disciplinary audiences