*Includes pictures *Profiles the debate over the intention of Lee's orders to Stuart and who's to blame for what happened *Includes accounts of Stuart's operation written by his adjutant general and others *Includes online resources and a bibliography for further reading *Includes a table of contents "The failure to crush the Federal army in Pennsylvania in 1863, in the opinion of almost all of the officers of the Army of Northern Virginia, can be expressed in five words-the absence of the cavalry." - Confederate General Henry Heth As Robert E. Lee's army moved into Pennsylvania in June 1863, Stuart's cavalry screened his movements, thereby engaging in the more traditional cavalry roles, but it's widely believed he was hoping to remove the negative effect of Brandy Station by duplicating one of his now famous rides around the enemy army, much as he did to McClellan's Army of the Potomac during the Peninsula Campaign in 1862. This time, however, as Lee began his march north through the Shenandoah Valley in western Virginia, it is highly unlikely that is what he wanted or expected. Before setting out on June 25, the methodical Lee gave Stuart specific instructions as to the role he was to play in the Pennsylvania offensive. As the eyes of the army, the cavalry was to guard the mountain passes with part of his force while the Army of Northern Virginia was still south of the Potomac River, and then cross the river with the remainder of his army and screen the right flank of Confederate general Richard Stoddert Ewell's II Corps as it moved down the Shenandoah Valley, maintaining contact with Ewell's army as it advanced towards Harrisburg. Instead of taking the most direct route north near the Blue Ridge Mountains, however, Stuart chose a much more ambitious course of action. Stuart decided to march his three best brigades (under Generals Hampton, Fitzhugh Lee, and Col. John R. Chambliss) between the Union army and Washington, north through Rockville to Westminster, and then into Pennsylvania, a route that would allow them to capture supplies along the way and wreak havoc as they skirted Washington. To complicate matters even more, as Stuart set out on June 25 on what was probably a glory-seeking mission, he was unaware that his intended path was blocked by columns of Union infantry that would invariably force him to veer farther east than he or Lee had anticipated. Ultimately, his decision would prevent him from linking up with Ewell as ordered and deprive Lee of his primary cavalry force as he advanced deeper and deeper into unfamiliar enemy territory. According to Halsey Wigfall (son of Confederate States Senator Louis Wigfall) who was in Stuart's infantry, "Stuart and his cavalry left Lee's] army on June 24 and did not contact his] army again until the afternoon of July 2, the second day of the Gettysburg] battle." According to Stuart's own account, on June 29 his men clashed briefly with two companies of Union cavalry in Westminster, Maryland, overwhelming and chasing them "a long distance on the Baltimore road," causing a "great panic" in the city of Baltimore. On June 30, the head of Stuart's column then encountered General Judson Kilpatrick's cavalry as it passed through Hanover, during which they reportedly captured a wagon train and scattered the Union army before Kilpatrick's men were able to regroup and drive Stuart and his men out of town. Then, after a 20 mile trek in the dark, Stuart's exhausted men reached Dover, Pennsylvania on the morning of July 1. H.B. McClellan would point out in his book about Stuart that Lee's orders meant the army commander "was aware that under the most favorable circumstances Stuart must be separated from the army for at least three or four days." However, Stuart's cavalry would be gone for 7 days, and Stuart was too far removed from the Army of Northern Virginia to warn Lee of the Army of the Potomac's movements.