In response to the pervasive destruction of nature-particularly as a result of anthropogenic climate change-there have been increasingly forceful calls, from a legal-philosophical perspective, to grant nature rights of its own. Yet this demand for rights remains tied to the system of subjective rights; it is a liberal line of argument that conceives of freedom (only) in terms of subjective rights and in their guise.
What is sometimes overlooked is that positive law is capable, even without recognizing rights of nature, of conferring highly personal legal positions on individual animals. For example, the prohibition on killing under species protection law effectively granted protected animals something akin to an individual right to life.
However, this status has been progressively curtailed, precisely under the influence of climate change. The new regulation on assessing the risk of killing individuals of collision-prone breeding bird species through the operation of wind turbines (§ 45b of the Federal Nature Conservation Act) is perhaps the most striking example of this development, as it now permits such risks even while accepting "socially adequate risks of loss." Such a provision can no longer be reconciled with the notion of autonomous rights of the affected animals: how can one ask a red kite whether it considers it worthwhile to risk its own life for the 1.5°C target? And who could claim to answer on its behalf?
Against this background, the book argues that the concept of rights of nature is subject to fundamental objections. At the same time, it shows that the threat to animals and nature posed by climate change can be addressed more coherently-even in theoretical terms-through the (generous) granting of collective legal standing to associations. In this way, responsibility for defining and protecting the relevant legal interests is consistently assigned to the legislature.