The author provides a comprehensive analysis of the caretaker federal government under Article 69(3) of the Basic Law. He examines its formation and justifies its necessity by reference to the need for a functioning state leadership. In doing so, he elaborates the government's role within the separation of powers as encompassing transfer, steering, and information functions.
He identifies stability as the guiding principle, deriving it from the Basic Law, linking it to phases of parliamentary instability, and developing criteria for legal assessment on this basis. Central in this regard are the principles of functional stability and supervisory stability.
The focus lies on the composition and legal status of the caretaker federal government. The author develops, for the first time, a standard for assessing the unreasonableness for incumbent officeholders by balancing the subjective interest in relinquishing office against the objective interest in continuing in office. He rejects the "petrification principle" advocated in the prevailing doctrine. Instead, he differentiates according to the level of legitimacy of the caretaker Federal Chancellor. The acting Chancellor may propose new ministers to the Federal President for appointment and request that they continue in office. Moreover, contrary to the prevailing view, the caretaker Federal Chancellor is also entitled to table a motion of confidence under Article 68 of the Basic Law. Finally, the author presents a detailed proposal for reform aimed at closing existing gaps in the constitutional framework.