What to make of the British and American experience in the Middle East? Simon Smith compares British and American foreign policy in the Far East and the Persian Gulf, explaining that the Anglo-American relationship was far from harmonious. Both powers tried manipulate the other to its own advantage. While Washington was clearly the stronger power, London, as Simon Smith argues, was never reduced to subservience. Michael Thornhill demonstrates by contrast that even during the height of imperial British influence in the Middle East it was never easy for Britain to always manipulate events for its own benefit. By examining the often neglected role of king Farouk, Thornhill argues that Egypt was forced to contend with "an imperial power which could, at a few hours notice, overwhelm or undermine Egypt's supposed sovereign institutions". Withdrawing support from king Farouk "while still having 80,000 troops three hours drive away from Cairo-amounted to intervention by other means", may have had the short term benefits for the British, but in turn, London was unwilling or unable to prevent Gamal Abdul Nasser and his revolutionary officers from seizing power in 1952. While London perhaps mishandled the transfer of power in Egypt, by contrast Clea Bunch points out how the British managed the transition from being the dominant power in Jordan to preserving a substantial influence by inviting American participation in securing regime legitimacy. "In the end, American dollars supported the Hashemite regime while British influence remained, just as British officials wished." James Worrall argues that by the mid 1970s there was an Anglo-American understanding "that the Northern Gulf was America's responsibility and that the southern Gulf was Britain's." Clive Jones examines how intelligence and clandestine operations were used and abused by the British in pursuit of their strategic interests, first somewhat unsuccessfully in Yemen in the 1960s, but with more tangible success in Oman in the 1970s.