Algorithmic Game Theory

.- Perpetually Fair Assignments Via Balanced Sequences of Permutations.
.- On the Power of Deception in Repeated Games.
.- Improved Approximation Guarantees for Groupwise Maximin Share Fairness.
.- Distributionally Robust Contract Design with Deferred Inspection.
.- Fair Division with Binary Valuations: Characterizations.
.- Single-Agent Stability in Additively Separable Hedonic Games with Constrained Coalition Sizes.
.- Control and Bribery in Stable Marriage and Roommates: A Complete Complexity Landscape.
.- Temporal Fair Division of Indivisible Goods with Structured Constraints.
.- Network Allocation Games with Anonymous Preferences.
.- Distributed Agent-Constrained Truthful Facility Location.
.- Nucleolus Computation by Non-Zero-Constrained Optimization.
.- Efficiently Restructuring Sovereign Debt via Arctic Auctions with Convex Costs.
.- Minimizing Cumulative Envy in Allocating a Sequence of Items.
.- Improved Lower Bounds and Output Augmentation for Facility Location Mechanisms.
.- Robustness of Persuasion to Receiver Preferences.
.- Stability in Combinatorial Markets with Side Payments .
.- Hospitals/Residents with Inseparable Couples: Finding a Coalition Stable Assignment Is NP-Hard.
.- Bribery’s Influence on Ranked Aggregation.
.- Complexity of Eliminating (Majority) Illusion in Directed Networks.
.- Leveraging Matchings in Constrained Fair Division with a Conflict Graph.
.- Realist Vampire(s) Seeking Consenting Suicidal Person(s).
.- Extension of Excess Demand Ascending Auction to Multi-Demand Model by Discrete Convex Analysis Approach.
.- Simultaneous Ordinal Maximin Share and Envy-Based Guarantees.
.- Individual Rationality in Constrained Hedonic Games: Friends, Enemies, and Neutrals.
.- Computing Fair and Efficient Indivisible Chore Allocations with Bounded Surplus.