Sovereign Debt Crises and Negotiations in Brazil and Mexico, 1888-1914: Governments versus Bankers
Autor Leonardo Welleren Limba Engleză Hardback – 8 mai 2018
This book analyzes the relative balance of bargaining power between governments and the banks in charge of underwriting their debt during the first financial globalization. Brazil and Mexico, both indebted countries that underwent major changes in reputation and negotiating power as they faced financial crises, provide valuable case studies of government strategies for obtaining the best possible outcomes. Previous literature has focused on bankers’ perspectives and emphasized that debtors were submissive during negotiations, but Weller finds that governments’ negotiating power varied over time. He presents a new analytical framework that interprets when and why officials were likely to negotiate loans more or less effectively, with newly uncovered primary sources from debtors’ and creditors’ archives suggesting key causes of variation: fiscal accounts, political stability, and creditors’ exposure and reputation.
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Specificații
ISBN-13: 9783319736327
ISBN-10: 3319736329
Pagini: 212
Ilustrații: XX, 183 p. 8 illus.
Dimensiuni: 148 x 210 mm
Greutate: 0.4 kg
Ediția:1st ed. 2018
Editura: Springer International Publishing
Colecția Palgrave Macmillan
Locul publicării:Cham, Switzerland
ISBN-10: 3319736329
Pagini: 212
Ilustrații: XX, 183 p. 8 illus.
Dimensiuni: 148 x 210 mm
Greutate: 0.4 kg
Ediția:1st ed. 2018
Editura: Springer International Publishing
Colecția Palgrave Macmillan
Locul publicării:Cham, Switzerland
Cuprins
Part I – Governments versus Bankers
1.Introduction
2. Governments versus Bankers in the Pre-1914 Sovereign Debt Market
Part II – Brazil versus Rothschilds
3. Rothschilds’ Tropical Empire: Brazil, 1822-1889
4. Rothschilds’ Troubled Republic: Brazil, 1889-1898
5. Rothschilds and Coffee Finance: Brazil, 1898-1914
Part III – Mexico versus Mediocre Banks
6. From Defaults to Redemption: Mexico, 1821-1890
7. The Bankers’ Beloved Dictatorship: Mexico, 1890-1910
8. The Loans of the Revolution: Mexico, 1911-1914
9. Conclusion
Notă biografică
Leonardo Weller is Lecturer at the São Paulo School of Economics, Fundação Getulio Vargas, (EESP-FGV), Brazil. He earned his PhD at the London School of Economics, UK.
Textul de pe ultima copertă
This book analyzes the relative balance of bargaining power between governments and the banks in charge of underwriting their debt during the first financial globalization. Brazil and Mexico, both indebted countries that underwent major changes in reputation and negotiating power as they faced financial crises, provide valuable case studies of government strategies for obtaining the best possible outcomes. Previous literature has focused on bankers’ perspectives and emphasized that debtors were submissive during negotiations, but Weller finds that governments’ negotiating power varied over time. He presents a new analytical framework that interprets when and why officials were likely to negotiate loans more or less effectively, with newly uncovered primary sources from debtors’ and creditors’ archives suggesting key causes of variation: fiscal accounts, political stability, and creditors’ exposure and reputation.
Caracteristici
Addresses the pre-1914 sovereign debt market from both creditors' and borrowing governments' perspectives
Presents new primary documents that bolster opinions of Brazil and Mexican government negotiation effectiveness
Proposes a new analytical framework to conceptualize how factors determined the relative power between governments and creditors
Presents new primary documents that bolster opinions of Brazil and Mexican government negotiation effectiveness
Proposes a new analytical framework to conceptualize how factors determined the relative power between governments and creditors